TEDxMidAtlantic
Avi Rubin: All your devices can be hacked
Alle dine apparater kan blive hacket
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Kan nogen hacke din pacemaker? Ved TEDxMidAtlantic forklarer Avi Rubin hvordan hackere kan kompromittere biler, smartphones og medicotekniske apparater. og advarer os om de farerne i en stigende hack-bar verden. (Filmet ved TEDxMidAtlantic.)
Avi Rubin - Computer security expert
Avi Rubin is a professor of computer science and director of the Health and Medical Security Lab at Johns Hopkins University. His research is focused on the security of electronic records -- including medical and voting records. Full bio
Avi Rubin is a professor of computer science and director of the Health and Medical Security Lab at Johns Hopkins University. His research is focused on the security of electronic records -- including medical and voting records. Full bio
Double-click the English transcript below to play the video.
00:12
I'm a computer science professor,
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Jeg er professor i datalogi,
00:15
and my area of expertise is
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og er ekspert indenfor
00:17
computer and information security.
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computer- og informationssikkerhed.
00:20
When I was in graduate school,
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Da jeg læste på universitet
00:22
I had the opportunity to overhear my grandmother
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overhørte jeg hvordan min bedstemor
00:25
describing to one of her fellow senior citizens
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beskrev overfor en af hendes ældre venner
00:29
what I did for a living.
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hvad jeg arbejde med.
00:31
Apparently, I was in charge of making sure that
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Tilsyneladende, havde jeg ansvaret for at
00:35
no one stole the computers from the university. (Laughter)
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ingen stjal computere fra universitetet. (latter)
00:39
And, you know, that's a perfectly reasonable thing
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Og, som I ved, det er en ganske fornuftig ting
00:41
for her to think, because I told her I was working
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for hende at tro, fordi jeg havde fortalt hende at jeg
00:43
in computer security,
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arbejde med computersikkerhed,
00:45
and it was interesting to get her perspective.
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og det var interessant at se det fra hendes perspektiv.
00:48
But that's not the most ridiculous thing I've ever heard
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Men det er ikke det mest morsomme jeg har hørt
00:51
anyone say about my work.
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nogen sige om mit arbejde.
00:53
The most ridiculous thing I ever heard is,
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Det mest latterlige jeg endnu har hørt var -
00:55
I was at a dinner party, and a woman heard
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Jeg var til en selskab og en kvinde hørte
00:58
that I work in computer security,
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at jeg arbejde med computersikkerhed
01:00
and she asked me if -- she said her computer had been
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og hun spurgte mig -- hun sagde at hendes computer var blevet
01:04
infected by a virus, and she was very concerned that she
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smittet med en virus, og hun var meget bekymret for
01:07
might get sick from it, that she could get this virus. (Laughter)
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hun kunne blive syg af den virus. (Latter)
01:11
And I'm not a doctor, but I reassured her
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Jeg er ikke en læge, men jeg forsikrede hende om
01:14
that it was very, very unlikely that this would happen,
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at det var meget meget usandsynligt at det ville ske,
01:17
but if she felt more comfortable, she could be free to use
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men hvis hun følte sig mere sikker kunne hun bruge
01:20
latex gloves when she was on the computer,
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gummihandsker når hun brugte sin computer
01:22
and there would be no harm whatsoever in that.
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og der ville ikke være noget farligt i det.
01:25
I'm going to get back to this notion of being able to get
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Jeg vil vende tilbage til den opfattelse
at det er muligt
at det er muligt
01:28
a virus from your computer, in a serious way.
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at få en virus fra sin computer, i en alvorligt sag.
01:31
What I'm going to talk to you about today
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Hvad jeg vil tale med jer om i dag
01:33
are some hacks, some real world cyberattacks that people
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er nogle hacks, nogle virkelige
cyber-angreb som folk
cyber-angreb som folk
01:38
in my community, the academic research community,
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i mit samfund, det videnskabelige forskningssamfund,
01:40
have performed, which I don't think
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har udført og som jeg ikke tror
01:43
most people know about,
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at mange mennesker har hørt om.
01:44
and I think they're very interesting and scary,
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og jeg syntes de er meget interessante og skræmmende
01:47
and this talk is kind of a greatest hits
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og denne tale er en slags greatest hits
01:50
of the academic security community's hacks.
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af hacks indenfor det akademiske samfund.
01:53
None of the work is my work. It's all work
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Intet af dette arbejde er mit arbejde,
det er alt sammen
det er alt sammen
01:55
that my colleagues have done, and I actually asked them
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udført af mine kollegaer og jeg har bedt dem
01:57
for their slides and incorporated them into this talk.
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om nogen af deres slides og
lagt dem ind i denne tale.
lagt dem ind i denne tale.
01:59
So the first one I'm going to talk about
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Så, det første jeg vil tale om
02:01
are implanted medical devices.
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er indopererede medicotekniske apparater.
02:04
Now medical devices have come a long way technologically.
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Nu er medicotekniske apparater kommet
langt teknologisk.
langt teknologisk.
02:07
You can see in 1926 the first pacemaker was invented.
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Dette er den første opfindelse af
en pacemaker fra 1926.
en pacemaker fra 1926.
02:11
1960, the first internal pacemaker was implanted,
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i 1960 den første indre pacemaker var indopereret,
02:14
hopefully a little smaller than that one that you see there,
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forhåbentligt en smule mindre end den I ser her,
02:17
and the technology has continued to move forward.
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og teknologien har forsat bevæget sig fremad
02:20
In 2006, we hit an important milestone from the perspective
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I 2006, ramte vi en vigtig milesten set ud fra
02:24
of computer security.
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computersikkerhed.
02:28
And why do I say that?
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Og hvorfor siger jeg dette?
02:29
Because that's when implanted devices inside of people
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Fordi det var dengang man begyndte at indoperere
02:32
started to have networking capabilities.
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apparater med netværksadgang.
02:35
One thing that brings us close to home is we look
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En ting som er bekendt vi kan kigge
02:36
at Dick Cheney's device, he had a device that
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på er Dick Cheney's apparat, han har et apparat
02:39
pumped blood from an aorta to another part of the heart,
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som pumper blod fra aorta til en anden del af hjertet,
02:43
and as you can see at the bottom there,
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og som I kan se nede i bunden her
02:44
it was controlled by a computer controller,
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var det kontrolleret af en computer
02:47
and if you ever thought that software liability
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og hvis I nogensinde har tænkt at software troværdighed
02:50
was very important, get one of these inside of you.
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var meget vigtigt, så prøv at få en af disse ind i dig.
02:53
Now what a research team did was they got their hands
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Hvad et forskningshold gjorde var at de fik fat på
02:57
on what's called an ICD.
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hvad der kaldes en ICD.
02:58
This is a defibrillator, and this is a device
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Det er en defibrillator, og det er et apparat
03:00
that goes into a person to control their heart rhythm,
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som placeres inde i personer for at
kontrollere deres hjerterytme
kontrollere deres hjerterytme
03:05
and these have saved many lives.
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og disse har reddet mange liv.
03:07
Well, in order to not have to open up the person
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Okay, for ikke at åbne op ind i personen
03:10
every time you want to reprogram their device
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hver gang vi ønsker at reprogrammere apparatet
03:12
or do some diagnostics on it, they made the thing be able
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eller lave noget diagnostik, de har gjort
dimsen i stand til
dimsen i stand til
03:14
to communicate wirelessly, and what this research team did
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at kommunikere trådløst, og hvad dette forskningsteam gjorde
03:17
is they reverse engineered the wireless protocol,
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var at reverse engineere den trådløse protokol
03:20
and they built the device you see pictured here,
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og bygge dette apparat I ser her,
03:22
with a little antenna, that could talk the protocol
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med en lille antenne, som kunne tale med
03:25
to the device, and thus control it.
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apparatet og derved kontrollere det.
03:29
In order to make their experience real -- they were unable
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For at gøre deres eksperiment naturtro --
de kunne ikke
de kunne ikke
03:32
to find any volunteers, and so they went
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nogen frivillige, så de tog noget
03:34
and they got some ground beef and some bacon
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kød og noget bacon
03:36
and they wrapped it all up to about the size
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og om bandt det sammen
03:38
of a human being's area where the device would go,
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så det svarede til en menneskekrop
03:41
and they stuck the device inside it
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og de placerede apparatet inde i det
03:42
to perform their experiment somewhat realistically.
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for at udføre deres eksperiment
nogenlunde realistisk.
nogenlunde realistisk.
03:46
They launched many, many successful attacks.
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De gennemførte mange succesfulde angreb.
03:49
One that I'll highlight here is changing the patient's name.
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En som jeg vil fremhæve her er at ændre
patientens navn.
patientens navn.
03:52
I don't know why you would want to do that,
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Jeg ved ikke hvorfor du skulle ønske at gøre det,
03:53
but I sure wouldn't want that done to me.
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men jeg er sikker på at jeg ikke ønskede
at det skete for mig.
at det skete for mig.
03:55
And they were able to change therapies,
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Og de kunne ændre på behandlinger,
03:57
including disabling the device -- and this is with a real,
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herunder at slå apparatet fra -- og dette med ægte,
04:00
commercial, off-the-shelf device --
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kommercielle, apparater i handlen --
04:01
simply by performing reverse engineering and sending
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kun ved at lave reverse engineering og sende
04:04
wireless signals to it.
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trådløse signaler til det.
04:07
There was a piece on NPR that some of these ICDs
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Der var en udsendelse på NPR,
at nogle af disse ICD'er
at nogle af disse ICD'er
04:10
could actually have their performance disrupted
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kan få deres funktion forstyrret
04:13
simply by holding a pair of headphones onto them.
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ved bare at holde et par hovedtelefoner hen til dem.
04:16
Now, wireless and the Internet
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Okay, trådløst netværk og internettet
04:18
can improve health care greatly.
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kan forbedre sundhedspleje enormt.
04:19
There's several examples up on the screen
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Der er adskillelige eksempler på skærmen
04:21
of situations where doctors are looking to implant devices
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med situationer hvor læger kan kigge på implanterede apparater
04:24
inside of people, and all of these devices now,
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inde i folk, og alle disse apparater kan som
04:27
it's standard that they communicate wirelessly,
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standard kommunikere trådløst,
04:30
and I think this is great,
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og jeg syntes det er fantastisk,
04:32
but without a full understanding of trustworthy computing,
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men uden fuld forståelse for sikre computere,
04:35
and without understanding what attackers can do
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og uden forståelse for hvad hackere kan gøre
04:37
and the security risks from the beginning,
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og sikkerhedsrisici fra begyndelsen,
04:39
there's a lot of danger in this.
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så er der mange farer ved det.
04:42
Okay, let me shift gears and show you another target.
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Okay, lad mig skifte gear og vise jer et andet mål.
04:43
I'm going to show you a few different targets like this,
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Jeg vil vise jer nogle andre typer mål som dette,
04:45
and that's my talk. So we'll look at automobiles.
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og det er min tale. Så vi vil kigge på biler.
04:48
This is a car, and it has a lot of components,
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Dette er en bil og den har en masse komponenter,
04:51
a lot of electronics in it today.
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en masse elektronik i den i dag.
04:53
In fact, it's got many, many different computers inside of it,
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Faktisk indeholder den en masse computere,
04:57
more Pentiums than my lab did when I was in college,
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flere pentiumer end mit laboratorium havde da jeg gik i college,
05:00
and they're connected by a wired network.
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og de er forbundne med et kablet netværk.
05:04
There's also a wireless network in the car,
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Der er også et trådløst netværk i bilen,
05:07
which can be reached from many different ways.
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som man kan tilgå på en række forskellige måder.
05:11
So there's Bluetooth, there's the FM and XM radio,
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Der er Bluetooth, der er FM og der er XM radio,
05:14
there's actually wi-fi, there's sensors in the wheels
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der er faktisk Wifi, der er sensorer i hjulene
05:17
that wirelessly communicate the tire pressure
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som trådløst kan kommunikere dæktrykket
05:19
to a controller on board.
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til et kontrolpanel.
05:21
The modern car is a sophisticated multi-computer device.
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Den moderne bil er et sofistikeret multicomputerapparat.
05:26
And what happens if somebody wanted to attack this?
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Og hvad sker der hvis nogen prøver at angribe det?
05:29
Well, that's what the researchers
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Well, det var hvad forskerne gjorde.
05:31
that I'm going to talk about today did.
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det vil jeg fortælle om i dag.
05:33
They basically stuck an attacker on the wired network
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Basalt set koblede en angriber sig på netværket både det kablede
05:36
and on the wireless network.
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og det trådløse netværk.
05:38
Now, they have two areas they can attack.
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Så, de havde to områder hvor de kunne angribe.
05:41
One is short-range wireless, where you can actually
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Et var det kortrækkende trådløse,
hvor du faktisk kan kommunikere
hvor du faktisk kan kommunikere
05:43
communicate with the device from nearby,
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med apparatet på tæt hold,
05:44
either through Bluetooth or wi-fi,
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enten gennem Bluetooth eller wi-fi,
05:47
and the other is long-range, where you can communicate
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og det andet var langtrækkende hvor
du kan kommunikere
du kan kommunikere
05:49
with the car through the cellular network,
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med bilen vha. mobilnettet,
05:51
or through one of the radio stations.
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eller gennem en af radiostationerne.
05:52
Think about it. When a car receives a radio signal,
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Tænk på det. Når bilen modtager et radiosignal,
05:56
it's processed by software.
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bliver det behandlet af software.
05:58
That software has to receive and decode the radio signal,
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Denne software skal modtage og afkode radiosignalet,
06:01
and then figure out what to do with it,
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for derefter at beslutte hvad den skal gøre med det,
06:02
even if it's just music that it needs to play on the radio,
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selvom det bare er musik der skal spilles i radioen,
06:05
and that software that does that decoding,
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og den software som udfører afkodningen,
06:07
if it has any bugs in it, could create a vulnerability
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hvis der er en fejl i den, kan føre til
en sårbarhed der kan
en sårbarhed der kan
06:10
for somebody to hack the car.
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udnyttes af nogen til at hacke bilen.
06:13
The way that the researchers did this work is,
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Måden forskerne gjorde dette var at
06:16
they read the software in the computer chips
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de læste softwaren i de computerchips
06:21
that were in the car, and then they used sophisticated
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der var i bilen og de brugte sofistikerede
06:24
reverse engineering tools
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reverse engineering værktøjer
06:25
to figure out what that software did,
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for at finde ud af hvordan softwaren fungerede,
06:27
and then they found vulnerabilities in that software,
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og de fandt sårbarheder i denne software,
06:30
and then they built exploits to exploit those.
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og de byggede exploits for at udnytte disse.
06:34
They actually carried out their attack in real life.
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De udførte faktisk deres angreb i virkeligheden.
06:36
They bought two cars, and I guess
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De købte to biler, og jeg tror
06:37
they have better budgets than I do.
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de har bedre budgetter end jeg.
06:40
The first threat model was to see what someone could do
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Den første trusselsmodel var at se om
hvad en angriber kunne gøre
hvad en angriber kunne gøre
06:43
if an attacker actually got access
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hvis han faktisk fik adgang
06:45
to the internal network on the car.
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til bilens interne netværk.
06:47
Okay, so think of that as, someone gets to go to your car,
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Okay, forstil dig at nogle kommer hen til din bil,
06:50
they get to mess around with it, and then they leave,
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de piler ved den og går igen,
06:52
and now, what kind of trouble are you in?
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og hvilke problemer er du så i?
06:55
The other threat model is that they contact you
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Den anden trusselsmodel er at de kontakter dig
06:58
in real time over one of the wireless networks
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direkte over et trådløse netværk
07:00
like the cellular, or something like that,
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f.eks. mobilnettet eller noget tilsvarende,
07:02
never having actually gotten physical access to your car.
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og faktisk aldrig har haft fysisk adgang til bilen.
07:06
This is what their setup looks like for the first model,
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Dette er hvordan deres setup så ud i
den første model,
den første model,
07:09
where you get to have access to the car.
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hvor de har adgang til bilen.
07:11
They put a laptop, and they connected to the diagnostic unit
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De tog en laptop og forbandt den til vedligeholdelsesenheden
07:14
on the in-car network, and they did all kinds of silly things,
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i bilene netværk, og de gjorde
en masse underlige ting,
en masse underlige ting,
07:17
like here's a picture of the speedometer
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som her et billede af speedometeret
07:20
showing 140 miles an hour when the car's in park.
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som viser 225 km/t mens bilen står parkeret.
07:23
Once you have control of the car's computers,
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Ligeså snart du har kontrol over bilens computere,
07:25
you can do anything.
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kan du gøre hvad som helst.
07:26
Now you might say, "Okay, that's silly."
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Nu kan du sige at det er underligt
07:28
Well, what if you make the car always say
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Men, hvad hvis du fik speedometeret til altid at sige
07:29
it's going 20 miles an hour slower than it's actually going?
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at farten er 30 km/t langsommere end
den faktisk er?
den faktisk er?
07:32
You might produce a lot of speeding tickets.
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Du vil modtage en masse fartbøder.
07:34
Then they went out to an abandoned airstrip with two cars,
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Så tog de til en nedlagt lufthavn med to biler,
07:38
the target victim car and the chase car,
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bilen der var mål og en forfølger,
07:41
and they launched a bunch of other attacks.
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og de udførte en række andre angreb.
07:44
One of the things they were able to do from the chase car
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En ting de var istand til fra forfølgerbilen
07:47
is apply the brakes on the other car,
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var at styre bremserne i den anden bil,
07:49
simply by hacking the computer.
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ved at hacke dens computer.
07:50
They were able to disable the brakes.
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De var istand til at slå bremserne fra.
07:53
They also were able to install malware that wouldn't kick in
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De var også istand til at installere
malware som ikke
malware som ikke
07:56
and wouldn't trigger until the car was doing something like
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ville udføre noget før bilen gjorde noget som at
07:58
going over 20 miles an hour, or something like that.
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køre over 30 km/t eller noget tilsvarende.
08:02
The results are astonishing, and when they gave this talk,
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Resultaterne var forbløffende og da de præsenterede dem,
08:05
even though they gave this talk at a conference
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selvom de gjorde det til en konference
08:06
to a bunch of computer security researchers,
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1726
til en samling computersikkerhedsforskere,
08:08
everybody was gasping.
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1700
gispede alle.
08:10
They were able to take over a bunch of critical computers
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De var istand til at overtage en håndfuld
kritiske computere
kritiske computere
08:13
inside the car: the brakes computer, the lighting computer,
183
481973
3761
inde i bilen: Bremsernes computer,
lysenes computer,
lysenes computer,
08:17
the engine, the dash, the radio, etc.,
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2827
motoren, instrumentbrættet, radioen, osv.,
08:20
and they were able to perform these on real commercial
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og de var istand til at gøre det med en rigtig bil
08:22
cars that they purchased using the radio network.
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som de overtog ved at bruge radioen.
08:25
They were able to compromise every single one of the
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De var istand til at bryde ind i hver enkelt
08:28
pieces of software that controlled every single one
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stykke software som kontrollerede hver enkelt
08:31
of the wireless capabilities of the car.
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3015
af de trådløse muligheder i bilen.
08:34
All of these were implemented successfully.
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Alt dette var succesfuldt udført.
08:36
How would you steal a car in this model?
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Hvordan vil du stjæle en bil af denne model?
08:39
Well, you compromise the car by a buffer overflow
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Well, du angriber med en buffer overflow
08:42
of vulnerability in the software, something like that.
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sårbarhed i softwaren eller tilsvarende.
08:45
You use the GPS in the car to locate it.
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Du bruger GPS'en til at finde den.
08:47
You remotely unlock the doors through the computer
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Du åbner døren ved at fjernbetjene dem
gennem computeren
gennem computeren
08:49
that controls that, start the engine, bypass anti-theft,
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517835
3138
som kontrollere dem, starter motoren
og forbigår tyverikontrollen
og forbigår tyverikontrollen
08:52
and you've got yourself a car.
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og du har fået dig en bil.
08:54
Surveillance was really interesting.
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2487
Overvågning er virkeligt interessant.
08:57
The authors of the study have a video where they show
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Forfatterne til studiet viste en video hvor
09:00
themselves taking over a car and then turning on
200
528337
2549
havde taget kontrol over bilen og tændt for
09:02
the microphone in the car, and listening in on the car
201
530886
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mikrofonen i bilen og lyttede til hvad de blev sagt
09:05
while tracking it via GPS on a map,
202
533647
3351
samtidigt med at bilen blev fulgt
vha GPS på et kort,
vha GPS på et kort,
09:08
and so that's something that the drivers of the car
203
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1713
og det kunne sket uden at bilens fører
09:10
would never know was happening.
204
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2168
fandt ud af det skete.
09:12
Am I scaring you yet?
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540879
2134
Har jeg fået skræmt jer?
09:15
I've got a few more of these interesting ones.
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543013
1943
Jeg har nogle flere spændende eksempler.
09:16
These are ones where I went to a conference,
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Der er en fra en konference jeg deltog i,
09:18
and my mind was just blown, and I said,
208
546789
1933
og min hjerne bare skreg og jeg sagde,
09:20
"I have to share this with other people."
209
548722
1826
"Jeg må fortælle andre om dette"
09:22
This was Fabian Monrose's lab
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1623
Dette er fra Fabian Monrose's lab
09:24
at the University of North Carolina, and what they did was
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på University of North Carolina,
og hvad de gjorde var
og hvad de gjorde var
09:27
something intuitive once you see it,
212
555627
2075
noget meget intuitiv når I har set det
09:29
but kind of surprising.
213
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1714
men noget overraskende.
09:31
They videotaped people on a bus,
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2259
De videofilmede folk i en bus,
09:33
and then they post-processed the video.
215
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og de efterbehandlede videoen.
09:36
What you see here in number one is a
216
564515
2463
Hvad I ser her er de numre der
09:38
reflection in somebody's glasses of the smartphone
217
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4383
reflekteres i ens briller fra en smartphone
09:43
that they're typing in.
218
571361
1425
som de taster ind.
09:44
They wrote software to stabilize --
219
572786
1975
De skrev noget software til at stabilisere --
09:46
even though they were on a bus
220
574761
1365
og selvom de var med en bus
09:48
and maybe someone's holding their phone at an angle --
221
576126
3211
og at nogle hold deres telefon i en vinkel --
09:51
to stabilize the phone, process it, and
222
579337
2370
til at stabilisere telefonen, behandle det
09:53
you may know on your smartphone, when you type
223
581707
1885
og som I ved på jeres smartphone,
når i taster
når i taster
09:55
a password, the keys pop out a little bit, and they were able
224
583592
2939
et password, talene vises et kort sekund,
og de var i stand
og de var i stand
09:58
to use that to reconstruct what the person was typing,
225
586531
2840
til at bruge dette til at rekonstruere
hvad personen tastede,
hvad personen tastede,
10:01
and had a language model for detecting typing.
226
589371
4321
og havde en sprogmodel til at opfatte indtastningen.
10:05
What was interesting is, by videotaping on a bus,
227
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2335
Det interessante er at ved at videofilme i en bus
10:08
they were able to produce exactly what people
228
596027
2129
er man i stand til at reproducere præcist hvad folk
10:10
on their smartphones were typing,
229
598156
2151
skrev på deres smartphones,
10:12
and then they had a surprising result, which is that
230
600307
2260
og deres overraskende resultat, som er at
10:14
their software had not only done it for their target,
231
602567
2764
deres software ikke kun angreb deres mål,
10:17
but other people who accidentally happened
232
605331
1403
men også andre folk som tilfældigvis
10:18
to be in the picture, they were able to produce
233
606734
2086
var i billedet, de kunne genskabe
10:20
what those people had been typing, and that was kind of
234
608820
2727
hvad disse folk havde tastet, og det var en slags
10:23
an accidental artifact of what their software was doing.
235
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3617
tilfældig egenskab ved hvad deres software gjorde.
10:27
I'll show you two more. One is P25 radios.
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4303
Jeg vil vise jer to eksempler mere.
Den første er P25 radioer.
Den første er P25 radioer.
10:31
P25 radios are used by law enforcement
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619467
2800
P25 radioer bruges af politiet
10:34
and all kinds of government agencies
238
622267
3407
og en række statslige tjenester
10:37
and people in combat to communicate,
239
625674
1736
og soldater til at kommunikere,
10:39
and there's an encryption option on these phones.
240
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2833
og der er en krypteringsmulighed på disse telefoner.
10:42
This is what the phone looks like. It's not really a phone.
241
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2728
Her kan I se hvordan telefonen ser ud.
Det er ikke en rigtig telefon.
Det er ikke en rigtig telefon.
10:44
It's more of a two-way radio.
242
632971
1206
Det er mere en tovejs radio.
10:46
Motorola makes the most widely used one, and you can see
243
634177
3322
Motorola laver den mest udbredte,
og som I kan se
og som I kan se
10:49
that they're used by Secret Service, they're used in combat,
244
637499
2649
er de brugt af Secret Service, de er brugt i kamp,
10:52
it's a very, very common standard in the U.S. and elsewhere.
245
640148
3102
det er en meget, meget udbredt standard i USA
og andre steder.
og andre steder.
10:55
So one question the researchers asked themselves is,
246
643250
2305
Så en af de ting forskerne spurgte sig selv om var:
10:57
could you block this thing, right?
247
645555
2704
Kan man blokere sådan en ting?
11:00
Could you run a denial-of-service,
248
648259
1583
Kan man udføre et denial-of-service angreb,
11:01
because these are first responders?
249
649842
1824
fordi den bruges på stedet?
11:03
So, would a terrorist organization want to black out the
250
651666
1801
Så, kunne en terroristorganisation
forsøge at mørkelægge
forsøge at mørkelægge
11:05
ability of police and fire to communicate at an emergency?
251
653467
4488
muligheden for at politi og brandvæsen
kan kommunikere i en ulykke?
kan kommunikere i en ulykke?
11:09
They found that there's this GirlTech device used for texting
252
657955
3072
De fandt denne GirlTech dims brugt til SMS
11:13
that happens to operate at the same exact frequency
253
661027
2718
som viste sig at bruge de eksakt samme frekvenser
11:15
as the P25, and they built what they called
254
663745
2271
som P25'eren, og de byggede hvad de kaldte
11:18
My First Jammer. (Laughter)
255
666016
4334
"Min første Jammer". (Latter)
11:22
If you look closely at this device,
256
670350
2378
Hvis du kigger grundigt på apparatet,
11:24
it's got a switch for encryption or cleartext.
257
672728
3630
har det en vælger for kryptering eller klartekst.
11:28
Let me advance the slide, and now I'll go back.
258
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3050
Lad mig skifte slide og nu gå tilbage.
11:31
You see the difference?
259
679408
2547
Kan I se forskellen?
11:33
This is plain text. This is encrypted.
260
681955
2557
Dette er klartekst. Dette er krypteret.
11:36
There's one little dot that shows up on the screen,
261
684512
2557
Der er en lille prik som bliver vist på skærmen,
11:39
and one little tiny turn of the switch.
262
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2085
og et lille drej på kontakten.
11:41
And so the researchers asked themselves, "I wonder how
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689154
1904
Og forskerne spurgte dem selv; "Gad vide hvor
11:43
many times very secure, important, sensitive conversations
264
691058
4257
mange gange meget hemmelige, vigtige
og følsomme samtaler
og følsomme samtaler
11:47
are happening on these two-way radios where they forget
265
695315
1623
foregår med disse tovejsradioer, hvor de har glemt
11:48
to encrypt and they don't notice that they didn't encrypt?"
266
696938
2910
at kryptere og de ikke har opdaget
at de ikke kryptere?"
at de ikke kryptere?"
11:51
So they bought a scanner. These are perfectly legal
267
699848
3339
Så de købte en skanner,
hvilket er fuldstændigt lovligt
hvilket er fuldstændigt lovligt
11:55
and they run at the frequency of the P25,
268
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3458
og kørte den på samme de frekvenser som P25,
11:58
and what they did is they hopped around frequencies
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706645
1767
og hvad de gjorde var at hoppe
rundt mellem disse frekvenser
rundt mellem disse frekvenser
12:00
and they wrote software to listen in.
270
708412
2510
og de skrev software for at lytte til med.
12:02
If they found encrypted communication, they stayed
271
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2634
Hvis de fandt krypteret kommunikation, de blev
12:05
on that channel and they wrote down, that's a channel
272
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1686
på kanalen og noterede at på den kanal
12:07
that these people communicate in,
273
715242
1788
var de folk som brugte den
12:09
these law enforcement agencies,
274
717030
1622
politiet
12:10
and they went to 20 metropolitan areas and listened in
275
718652
3391
og de var i 20 storbyområder og lyttede med
12:14
on conversations that were happening at those frequencies.
276
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3475
på de samtaler som foregik på disse frekvenser.
12:17
They found that in every metropolitan area,
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3239
De fandt at i hvert storbyområde,
12:20
they would capture over 20 minutes a day
278
728757
2154
kunne de opfange over 20 minutters daglig
12:22
of cleartext communication.
279
730911
2375
ukrypteret kommunikation.
12:25
And what kind of things were people talking about?
280
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2000
Og hvad var det for ting folk talte om?
12:27
Well, they found the names and information
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735286
1484
Well, de fandt navne og information om
12:28
about confidential informants. They found information
282
736770
2852
om hemmelige meddelere. De fandt information
12:31
that was being recorded in wiretaps,
283
739622
2202
som var blevet optaget af aflytningsudstyr,
12:33
a bunch of crimes that were being discussed,
284
741824
2710
en flok kriminelle der diskuterede,
12:36
sensitive information.
285
744534
1162
følsomme oplysninger.
12:37
It was mostly law enforcement and criminal.
286
745696
3363
Det var mest politi og kriminelle.
12:41
They went and reported this to the law enforcement
287
749059
1834
De rapporterede det til politiet
12:42
agencies, after anonymizing it,
288
750893
2023
efter at have anonymiseret det,
12:44
and the vulnerability here is simply the user interface
289
752916
3000
og sårbarheden her er simpelthen at brugergrænsefladen
12:47
wasn't good enough. If you're talking
290
755916
1394
ikke er god nok. Hvis du taler om noget
12:49
about something really secure and sensitive, it should
291
757310
2816
som er virkeligt hemmeligt og følsomt,
så skal det være helt klart
så skal det være helt klart
12:52
be really clear to you that this conversation is encrypted.
292
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3293
for dig at samtalen er krypteret.
12:55
That one's pretty easy to fix.
293
763419
1886
Den er forholdsvis enkelt af ordne.
12:57
The last one I thought was really, really cool,
294
765305
1669
Den sidste er rigtig, rigtig cool,
12:58
and I just had to show it to you, it's probably not something
295
766974
2813
og jeg vil vise den til jer, det er ikke noget
13:01
that you're going to lose sleep over
296
769787
1005
der vil holde jer søvnløse om natten
13:02
like the cars or the defibrillators,
297
770792
1791
som bilerne eller defibrillatorene,
13:04
but it's stealing keystrokes.
298
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3023
men det er at stjæle tastetryk.
13:07
Now, we've all looked at smartphones upside down.
299
775606
2747
Vi kender smartphones oppefra og ned.
13:10
Every security expert wants to hack a smartphone,
300
778353
2190
Hver eneste sikkerhedsekspert ønsker
at hacke en smartphone,
at hacke en smartphone,
13:12
and we tend to look at the USB port, the GPS for tracking,
301
780543
4612
og vi kiggede på USB porten, GPS'en for tracking,
13:17
the camera, the microphone, but no one up till this point
302
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3208
kameraet, mikrofonen, men ingen har hidtil
13:20
had looked at the accelerometer.
303
788363
1580
kigget på accelerometerne.
13:21
The accelerometer is the thing that determines
304
789943
1647
Et accelerometer er den ting som måler den
13:23
the vertical orientation of the smartphone.
305
791590
3494
den lodrette orientering af smartphonen.
13:27
And so they had a simple setup.
306
795084
1417
De havde et simpelt setup.
13:28
They put a smartphone next to a keyboard,
307
796501
2758
De placerede en smartphone
ved siden af keyboardet,
ved siden af keyboardet,
13:31
and they had people type, and then their goal was
308
799259
2712
og de havde folk til at taste og deres mål var
13:33
to use the vibrations that were created by typing
309
801971
2856
at bruge vibrationerne som var skabt ved at taste
13:36
to measure the change in the accelerometer reading
310
804827
4240
til at måle ændringer i accelerometeret
13:41
to determine what the person had been typing.
311
809067
3176
for at bestemme hvad person skrev.
13:44
Now, when they tried this on an iPhone 3GS,
312
812243
2576
Da de prøvede det med en iPhone 3GS,
13:46
this is a graph of the perturbations that were created
313
814819
2769
er dette en graf over rystelserne som blev skabt
13:49
by the typing, and you can see that it's very difficult
314
817588
3241
af tastningerne. Og som I kan se er det
meget vanskeligt
meget vanskeligt
13:52
to tell when somebody was typing or what they were typing,
315
820829
3078
at afgøre om nogen taster eller hvad de taster,
13:55
but the iPhone 4 greatly improved the accelerometer,
316
823907
3090
men iPhone 4 har et meget forbedret accelerometer,
13:58
and so the same measurement
317
826997
3480
og den samme måling
14:02
produced this graph.
318
830477
1832
skabte denne graf.
14:04
Now that gave you a lot of information while someone
319
832309
2486
Dette gav dem en masse information mens nogen
14:06
was typing, and what they did then is used advanced
320
834795
3241
tastede, og hvad de gjorde var
at anvende en avanceret
at anvende en avanceret
14:10
artificial intelligence techniques called machine learning
321
838036
3007
kunstig intelligensteknik kaldet maskinlæring
14:13
to have a training phase,
322
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1431
til at have en træningsfase,
14:14
and so they got most likely grad students
323
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2236
hvor de havde en masse studerende
14:16
to type in a whole lot of things, and to learn,
324
844710
3789
til at taste en masse ind, og de satte
14:20
to have the system use the machine learning tools that
325
848499
2768
systemet til at bruge dette maskinlæringsværktøj
14:23
were available to learn what it is that the people were typing
326
851267
2863
som var istand til at lære hvad folkene tastede,
14:26
and to match that up
327
854130
2827
og de sammenlignede dette med
14:28
with the measurements in the accelerometer.
328
856957
2477
målingerne fra accelerometeret.
14:31
And then there's the attack phase, where you get
329
859434
1635
Og der er en angrebsfase, hvor du får nogen
14:33
somebody to type something in, you don't know what it was,
330
861069
2811
til at taste noget ind, som du ikke ved hvad er,
14:35
but you use your model that you created
331
863880
1297
men du bruger den model du har skabt
14:37
in the training phase to figure out what they were typing.
332
865177
3442
i træningsfasen til at regne ud hvad de taster.
14:40
They had pretty good success. This is an article from the USA Today.
333
868619
3484
De havde temmelig god succes.
Dette er en artikel fra USA Today.
Dette er en artikel fra USA Today.
14:44
They typed in, "The Illinois Supreme Court has ruled
334
872103
2609
De tastede følgende:
"The Illinois Supreme Court has ruled
"The Illinois Supreme Court has ruled
14:46
that Rahm Emanuel is eligible to run for Mayor of Chicago"
335
874712
2962
that Rahm Emanuel is eligible
to run for Mayor of Chicago"
to run for Mayor of Chicago"
14:49
— see, I tied it in to the last talk —
336
877674
1354
— se, jeg forbinder den med den forrige taler —
14:51
"and ordered him to stay on the ballot."
337
879028
2118
"and ordered him to stay on the ballot."
14:53
Now, the system is interesting, because it produced
338
881146
2771
Se! systemet er interessant, fordi det producerede
14:55
"Illinois Supreme" and then it wasn't sure.
339
883917
2886
"Illinois Supreme" og så var det usikkert.
14:58
The model produced a bunch of options,
340
886803
1950
Modellen producerede en række muligheder,
15:00
and this is the beauty of some of the A.I. techniques,
341
888753
2709
og skønheden ved mange kunstig intelligensteknikker,
15:03
is that computers are good at some things,
342
891462
2250
er at computere er gode til nogle ting,
15:05
humans are good at other things,
343
893712
1534
mennesker er gode til andre.
15:07
take the best of both and let the humans solve this one.
344
895246
1931
Tag det bedste fra begge og
lad mennesker løse denne.
lad mennesker løse denne.
15:09
Don't waste computer cycles.
345
897177
1382
Spil ikke compterkraft på det.
15:10
A human's not going to think it's the Supreme might.
346
898559
2136
Et menneske vil ikke tænke at det er
"Supreme might".
"Supreme might".
15:12
It's the Supreme Court, right?
347
900695
1740
Det er "Supreme Court", ikke sandt?
15:14
And so, together we're able to reproduce typing
348
902435
2530
og videre, vi er istand til at rekonstruere
hvad der blev tastet
hvad der blev tastet
15:16
simply by measuring the accelerometer.
349
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simpelthen ved at måle med accelerometeret.
15:19
Why does this matter? Well, in the Android platform,
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Hvorfor er dette vigtigt? Fordi,
på Android platformen,
på Android platformen,
15:23
for example, the developers have a manifest
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for eksempel, har udviklerne et manifest
15:27
where every device on there, the microphone, etc.,
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hvor hvert apparat der, mikrofonen, osv,
15:30
has to register if you're going to use it
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skal vi at at du er i gang med at bruge det
15:32
so that hackers can't take over it,
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så hackere ikke kan overtage det,
15:34
but nobody controls the accelerometer.
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men ingen kontrollerer accelerometeret.
15:37
So what's the point? You can leave your iPhone next to
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Så hvad er pointen?
Du kan lægge din iPhone ved siden af
Du kan lægge din iPhone ved siden af
15:39
someone's keyboard, and just leave the room,
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en eller andens keyboard og forlade rummet
15:41
and then later recover what they did,
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og senere genskabe hvad de gjorde,
15:43
even without using the microphone.
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endda uden at bruge mikrofonen.
15:45
If someone is able to put malware on your iPhone,
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Hvis nogen kan installere malware på din iPhone,
15:47
they could then maybe get the typing that you do
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kunne de muligvis se hvad du skriver
15:50
whenever you put your iPhone next to your keyboard.
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hver gang du lægger din iPhone
ved siden af dit keyboard.
ved siden af dit keyboard.
15:52
There's several other notable attacks that unfortunately
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Der er flere andre nævneværdige angreb
som jeg desværre
som jeg desværre
15:54
I don't have time to go into, but the one that I wanted
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ikke har tid til at komme ind på,
men en som jeg ønsker at
men en som jeg ønsker at
15:56
to point out was a group from the University of Michigan
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fremhæve er lavet af en gruppe fra
University of Michigan
University of Michigan
15:59
which was able to take voting machines,
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som var istand til at tage en stemmemaskine,
16:01
the Sequoia AVC Edge DREs that
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Sequoia AVC Edge DRE, som skal
16:04
were going to be used in New Jersey in the election
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bruges i New Jersey til afstemningen
16:05
that were left in a hallway, and put Pac-Man on it.
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som var efterladt i en gang,
og installerede Pac-Man på den.
og installerede Pac-Man på den.
16:07
So they ran the Pac-Man game.
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Hvorefter de spillede Pac-Man.
16:11
What does this all mean?
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Hvad betyder alt dette?
16:13
Well, I think that society tends to adopt technology
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Well, jeg tror at samfundet har en tendens
til at tage teknologien til sig
til at tage teknologien til sig
16:16
really quickly. I love the next coolest gadget.
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meget hurtigt. Jeg elsker de nyeste cool gadgets.
16:19
But it's very important, and these researchers are showing,
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Men det er meget vigtigt, og disse forskere viser
16:22
that the developers of these things
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at udviklerne af disse ting
16:23
need to take security into account from the very beginning,
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skal tænke sikkerhed ind fra begyndelsen,
16:26
and need to realize that they may have a threat model,
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og de må indse at de skal have en trusselsmodel,
16:29
but the attackers may not be nice enough
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og at angriberne næppe er så venlige
16:31
to limit themselves to that threat model,
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til at begrænse sig til den trusselsmodel,
16:33
and so you need to think outside of the box.
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og at at man skal kunne tænke ud af boksen.
16:36
What we can do is be aware
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Hvad vi kan gøre er at være opmærksomme på
16:37
that devices can be compromised,
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at apparater kan blive kompromitteret,
16:40
and anything that has software in it
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og at alt hvad der har software i sig
16:41
is going to be vulnerable. It's going to have bugs.
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vil være sårbart. Det vil have fejl.
16:44
Thank you very much. (Applause)
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Mange tak for jeres opmærksomhed. (Bifald)
ABOUT THE SPEAKER
Avi Rubin - Computer security expertAvi Rubin is a professor of computer science and director of the Health and Medical Security Lab at Johns Hopkins University. His research is focused on the security of electronic records -- including medical and voting records.
Why you should listen
Along with running the Health and Medical Security Lab, Avi Rubin is also the technical director of the JHU Information Security Institute. From 1997 to 2002, Avi was a researcher in AT&T’s Secure Systems Department, where he focused on cryptography and network security. He is also the founder of Harbor Labs, which provides expert testimony and review in legal cases related to high tech security. Avi has authored several books related to electronic security, including Brave New Ballot, published in 2006.
Avi Rubin | Speaker | TED.com