TED2011
Ralph Langner: Cracking Stuxnet, a 21st-century cyber weapon
Ralph Langer: Razotkrivanje Stuxneta, virtualnog oružja 21. stoljeća
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Kada je prvi put otkriven, 2010 godine, kompjuterski crv Stuxnet predstavljao je zbunjujuću zagonetku. Uz visoki nivo sofisticiranosti pojavila se zabrinjavajuća misterija: njegova svrha. Ralph Langner i njegov tim sudjelovali su u otkrivanju značenja koda koji je pokazao glavnu metu ove digitalne bojne glave -- i njeno prekriveno podrijetlo. U fascinantnom uvidu u računalnu forenziku, Langner objašnjava njihov pristup.
Ralph Langner - Security consultant
Ralph Langner is a German control system security consultant. He has received worldwide recognition for his analysis of the Stuxnet malware. Full bio
Ralph Langner is a German control system security consultant. He has received worldwide recognition for his analysis of the Stuxnet malware. Full bio
Double-click the English transcript below to play the video.
00:15
The idea behind the Stuxnet computer worm
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Ideja koja stoji iza Stuxnet računalnog crva
00:18
is actually quite simple.
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zapravo je prilično jednostavna.
00:20
We don't want Iran to get the bomb.
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Ne želimo da Iran proizvede atomsku bombu.
00:23
Their major asset for developing nuclear weapons
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Njihovo je glavno sredstvo za razvijanje nuklearnog oružja
00:26
is the Natanz uranium enrichment facility.
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Natanz postrojenje za obogaćivanje urana.
00:30
The gray boxes that you see,
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Sive kutije, koje vidite,
00:32
these are real-time control systems.
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jesu kontrolni sistemi.
00:35
Now if we manage to compromise these systems
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Ako uspijemo onesposobiti te sustave
00:38
that control drive speeds and valves,
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koji kontroliraju brzinu i ventile,
00:41
we can actually cause a lot of problems
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možemo stvoriti puno problema
00:44
with the centrifuge.
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s centrifugom.
00:46
The gray boxes don't run Windows software;
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Sive kutije ne podržavaju Windows software;
00:48
they are a completely different technology.
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one koriste posve drugačiju tehnologiju.
00:51
But if we manage
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Ali ako uspijemo
00:53
to place a good Windows virus
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staviti dobar Windows virus
00:56
on a notebook
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na laptop
00:58
that is used by a maintenance engineer
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koji koristi inženjer za održavanje sustava
01:00
to configure this gray box,
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prilikom konfiguriranja sustava,
01:03
then we are in business.
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na konju smo.
01:05
And this is the plot behind Stuxnet.
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I to je pozadina Stuxneta.
01:08
So we start with a Windows dropper.
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Započinjemo Windows "dropper" virusom.
01:13
The payload goes onto the gray box,
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Virus uđe u sivu kutiju,
01:16
damages the centrifuge,
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ošteti centrifugu
01:18
and the Iranian nuclear program is delayed --
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i time odgodi iranski nuklearni program --
01:20
mission accomplished.
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misija završena.
01:22
That's easy, huh?
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Jednostavno, zar ne?
01:24
I want to tell you how we found that out.
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Želim vam objasniti kako smo to otkrili.
01:27
When we started our research on Stuxnet six months ago,
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Kada smo prije šest mjeseci započeli istraživati Stuxneta,
01:30
it was completely unknown what the purpose of this thing was.
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svrha mu je bila potpuno nepoznata.
01:33
The only thing that was known
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Jedino što se znalo
01:35
is it's very, very complex on the Windows part, the dropper part,
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je njegov iznimno složen softverski dio, složen "dropper" dio
01:38
used multiple zero-day vulnerabilities.
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te da koristi mnoge neotkrivene slabosti Windowsa.
01:41
And it seemed to want to do something
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Činilo se kako želi nešto
01:44
with these gray boxes, these real-time control systems.
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s tim sivim kutijama, odnosno s kontrolnim sustavom.
01:46
So that got our attention,
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To je privuklo našu pozornost,
01:48
and we started a lab project
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pa smo počeli s laboratorijskim projektom
01:50
where we infected our environment with Stuxnet
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u kojem smo zarazili našu okolinu sa Stuxnetom
01:54
and checked this thing out.
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i promatrali što se događa.
01:56
And then some very funny things happened.
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Počele su se događati čudne stvari.
01:59
Stuxnet behaved like a lab rat
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Stuxnet se ponašao poput laboratorijskog štakora
02:02
that didn't like our cheese --
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koji nije želio naš sir --
02:05
sniffed, but didn't want to eat.
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pomirišao ga je, ali ga nije htio jesti.
02:07
Didn't make sense to me.
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To nije imalo smisla.
02:09
And after we experimented with different flavors of cheese,
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Nakon što smo eksperimentirali sa sirevima različitih okusa,
02:12
I realized, well, this is a directed attack.
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shvatio sam kako se radi o direktnom napadu.
02:16
It's completely directed.
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Potpuno je režiran.
02:18
The dropper is prowling actively
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"Dropper" se aktivno prikrada
02:20
on the gray box
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sivoj kutiji,
02:22
if a specific configuration is found,
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ako pronađe određenu konfiguraciju
02:25
and even if the actual program code that it's trying to infect
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i ako se program kojeg pokušava "zaraziti"
02:29
is actually running on that target.
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odvija na željenoj meti.
02:31
And if not, Stuxnet does nothing.
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Ako ne, Stuxnet ne čini ništa.
02:34
So that really got my attention,
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To je zaokupilo moju pažnju,
02:36
and we started to work on this
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i počeli smo neprestano
02:38
nearly around the clock,
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raditi na tome
02:40
because I thought, "Well, we don't know what the target is.
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jer sam mislio "Dobro, ne znamo što je meta.
02:43
It could be, let's say for example,
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Mogla bi to biti, primjerice,
02:45
a U.S. power plant,
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američka nuklearna elektrana
02:47
or a chemical plant in Germany.
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ili kemijsko postrojenje u Njemačkoj.
02:49
So we better find out what the target is soon."
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Bolje nam je da što prije otkrijemo metu.
02:52
So we extracted and decompiled
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Izdvojili smo i rastavili
02:54
the attack code,
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šifru napada
02:56
and we discovered that it's structured in two digital bombs --
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te smo otkrili da je sastavljena u dvije digitalne bombe --
02:59
a smaller one and a bigger one.
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manje i veće.
03:02
And we also saw that they are very professionally engineered
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Isto tako, shvatili smo da su ih vrlo profesionalno sastavili
03:06
by people who obviously had all insider information.
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ljudi koji su očito imali informacije iznutra.
03:10
They knew all the bits and bites
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Znali su sve sitnice
03:12
that they had to attack.
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koje su morali napasti.
03:14
They probably even know the shoe size of the operator.
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Vjerojatno su znali i veličinu cipela rukovaoca.
03:17
So they know everything.
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Znali su sve.
03:19
And if you have heard that the dropper of Stuxnet
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Ako ste čuli da je Stuxnetov program za instaliranje virusa
03:22
is complex and high-tech,
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kompeksan i visoko tehnološki razvijen,
03:24
let me tell you this:
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reći ću vam sljedeće:
03:26
the payload is rocket science.
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on je zapravo "kvantna fizika".
03:28
It's way above everything
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Daleko je iznad svega
03:30
that we have ever seen before.
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što smo do sada vidjeli.
03:33
Here you see a sample of this actual attack code.
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Ovdje vidite uzorak stvarne šifre napada.
03:36
We are talking about --
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Govorimo o
03:38
around about 15,000 lines of code.
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otprilikie 15 tisuća redaka programskog koda.
03:41
Looks pretty much like old-style assembly language.
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Izgleda kao stari asemblerski jezik.
03:44
And I want to tell you how we were able
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I želim vam reći kako smo uspjeli
03:46
to make sense out of this code.
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shvatiti smisao tog programskog koda.
03:48
So what we were looking for is, first of all, system function calls,
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Prvo smo tražili pozive funkcija sistema
03:51
because we know what they do.
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jer smo znali što one rade.
03:53
And then we were looking for timers and data structures
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Onda smo tražili vremenske zapise i strukture podataka
03:57
and trying to relate them to the real world --
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i pokušali ih povezati sa stvarnim svijetom --
03:59
to potential real world targets.
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s potencijalnim metama iz stvarnog svijeta.
04:01
So we do need target theories
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Znači, ipak trebamo teorije o ciljevima
04:04
that we can prove or disprove.
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kako bismo ih mogli dokazati ili opovrgnuti.
04:07
In order to get target theories,
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Kako bi došli do teorija o ciljevima,
04:09
we remember
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trebamo imati na umu
04:11
that it's definitely hardcore sabotage,
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kako se sigurno radi o ozbiljnoj sabotaži,
04:13
it must be a high-value target
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visoko vrijednom cilju
04:15
and it is most likely located in Iran,
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koji se najvjerojatnije nalazi u Iranu
04:18
because that's where most of the infections had been reported.
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jer je tamo prijavljen najveći broj zaraza ovim crvom.
04:22
Now you don't find several thousand targets in that area.
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Nećete naći nekoliko tisuća meta u tom području.
04:25
It basically boils down
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Načelno se to svodi
04:27
to the Bushehr nuclear power plant
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na nuklearnu elektranu Bushehr
04:29
and to the Natanz fuel enrichment plant.
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i na pogon za obogaćivanje goriva Natanz.
04:31
So I told my assistant,
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Rekao sam svom pomoćniku,
04:33
"Get me a list of all centrifuge and power plant experts from our client base."
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"Nabavi mi popis svih stručnjaka za centrifuge i elektrane iz naše baze klijenata."
04:36
And I phoned them up and picked their brain
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Ja sam ih tada nazvao,
04:38
in an effort to match their expertise
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te sam se potrudio ukopiti njihove spoznaje
04:40
with what we found in code and data.
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s onim što smo našli u programskom kodu i podacima.
04:43
And that worked pretty well.
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I to je funkcioniralo prilično dobro.
04:45
So we were able to associate
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Uspjeli smo povezati
04:47
the small digital warhead
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malu digitalnu bojnu glavu
04:49
with the rotor control.
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s kontrolom rotora.
04:51
The rotor is that moving part within the centrifuge,
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Rotor je ovaj pokretni dio unutar centrifuge,
04:54
that black object that you see.
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crni objekt koji vidite.
04:56
And if you manipulate the speed of this rotor,
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Ako manipulirate brzinom tog rotora,
04:59
you are actually able to crack the rotor
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u mogućnosti ste slomiti rotor
05:01
and eventually even have the centrifuge explode.
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i u konačnici postići eksploziju centrifuge.
05:05
What we also saw
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Također smo vidjeli
05:07
is that the goal of the attack
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da je cij napada
05:09
was really to do it slowly and creepy --
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učiniti to sporo i jezivo --
05:12
obviously in an effort
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očito u nadi
05:14
to drive maintenance engineers crazy,
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da izludite inžinjere održavanja,
05:17
that they would not be able to figure this out quickly.
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kako ne bi bili u mogućnosti naći rješenje u kratkom roku.
05:20
The big digital warhead -- we had a shot at this
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Veliku digitalnu bojnu glavu -- imali smo priliku
05:23
by looking very closely
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pomno promatriti
05:25
at data and data structures.
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podatke i strukture podataka.
05:27
So for example, the number 164
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Tako naprimjer, broj 164
05:29
really stands out in that code;
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se zbilja ističe u tom kodu;
05:31
you can't overlook it.
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ne možete ga previdjeti.
05:33
I started to research scientific literature
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Počeo sam istraživati znanstvenu literaturu
05:35
on how these centrifuges
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i otkrio kako su centrifuge
05:37
are actually built in Natanz
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zapravo napravljene u Natanzu
05:39
and found they are structured
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i saznao sam da su strukturirane
05:41
in what is called a cascade,
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u tzv. kaskadu,
05:43
and each cascade holds 164 centrifuges.
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od kojih svaka sadrži 164 centrifuge.
05:47
So that made sense, that was a match.
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To je imalo smisla te se podudaralo.
05:49
And it even got better.
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Čak je postalo bolje.
05:51
These centrifuges in Iran
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Te su centrifuge u Iranu
05:53
are subdivided into 15, what is called, stages.
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podijeljene u 15 tzv. faza.
05:57
And guess what we found in the attack code?
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Pogodite što smo našli u kodu napada?
05:59
An almost identical structure.
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Gotovo identičnu strukturu.
06:01
So again, that was a real good match.
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Dakle, to je bila odlična podudarnost.
06:04
And this gave us very high confidence for what we were looking at.
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To nam je dalo veliko samopouzdanje u ono što smo proučavali.
06:07
Now don't get me wrong here, it didn't go like this.
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Nemojte me pogrešno shvatiti, nije išlo lako.
06:10
These results have been obtained
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Ovi rezultati dobiveni su
06:13
over several weeks of really hard labor.
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tijekom nekoliko tjedana zaista teškog rada.
06:16
And we often went into just a dead end
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I često bi došli do mrtve točke i
06:19
and had to recover.
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trebali smo se vratiti natrag.
06:21
Anyway, so we figured out
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Tako smo shvatili
06:23
that both digital warheads
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kako su obje digitalne bojne glave
06:25
were actually aiming at one and the same target,
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zapravo usmjerene na jedan cilj,
06:27
but from different angles.
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ali iz različitih kutova.
06:29
The small warhead is taking one cascade,
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Mala bojna glava zauzima jednu kaskadu,
06:32
and spinning up the rotors and slowing them down,
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okreće rotore te ih usporava,
06:35
and the big warhead
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a velika bojna glava
06:37
is talking to six cascades
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komunicira sa šest kaskada
06:39
and manipulating valves.
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i manipulira ventilima.
06:41
So in all, we are very confident
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Dakle jedino u što smo sigurni
06:43
that we have actually determined what the target is.
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je da smo zapravo odredili što je cilj.
06:45
It is Natanz, and it is only Natanz.
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To je Natanz, i to samo Natanz.
06:48
So we don't have to worry
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Ne moramo se brinuti
06:50
that other targets
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oko drugih meta
06:52
might be hit by Stuxnet.
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koje bi mogle biti pogođene Stuxnetom.
06:54
Here's some very cool stuff that we saw --
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Evo neke zgodne stvari koju smo uočili --
06:57
really knocked my socks off.
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koja me zaista iznenadila.
06:59
Down there is the gray box,
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Tu dolje je siva kutija,
07:01
and on the top you see the centrifuges.
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a na vrhu vidite centrifuge.
07:04
Now what this thing does
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E sad, ono što ta stvar radi
07:06
is it intercepts the input values from sensors --
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je hvatanje ulaznih vrijednosti sa senzora --
07:09
so for example, from pressure sensors
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tako da se na primjer, sa senzora za pritisak
07:11
and vibration sensors --
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i senzora za vibraciju
07:13
and it provides legitimate program code,
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stvara pravi programski kod
07:16
which is still running during the attack,
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koji još uvijek radi za vrijeme napada
07:18
with fake input data.
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s lažnim ulaznim podacima.
07:20
And as a matter of fact, this fake input data
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Zapravo su ovi lažni ulazni podaci
07:22
is actually prerecorded by Stuxnet.
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unaprijed snimljni od strane Stuxneta.
07:25
So it's just like from the Hollywood movies
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To je baš kao u Hollywoodskim filmovima
07:27
where during the heist,
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gdje za vrijeme pljačke
07:29
the observation camera is fed with prerecorded video.
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sigurnosna kamera prikazuje prethodno snimljeni video.
07:32
That's cool, huh?
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To je cool, zar ne?
07:35
The idea here is obviously
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Ovdje očito ideja nije
07:37
not only to fool the operators in the control room.
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samo zavarati operatere u kontrolnoj sobi.
07:40
It actually is much more dangerous and aggressive.
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Zapravo je mnogo opasnija i agresivnija.
07:44
The idea
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Ideja je
07:46
is to circumvent a digital safety system.
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nadmudriti digitalni sigurnosni sustav.
07:50
We need digital safety systems
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Trebamo digitalne sigurnosne sustave
07:52
where a human operator could not act quick enough.
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tamo gdje ljudi ne mogu djelovati dovoljno brzo.
07:55
So for example, in a power plant,
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Na primjer, u elektrani,
07:57
when your big steam turbine gets too over speed,
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gdje velika parna turbina dobiva veliko ubrzanje,
08:00
you must open relief valves within a millisecond.
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morate otvoriti ventile unutar milisekunde.
08:03
Obviously, this cannot be done by a human operator.
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Očito da to ne može obaviti čovjek.
08:06
So this is where we need digital safety systems.
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Stoga su tu digitalni sigurnosni sistemi zaista potrebni.
08:08
And when they are compromised,
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A kada su kompromitirani,
08:10
then real bad things can happen.
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mogu se dogoditi stvarno loše stvari.
08:13
Your plant can blow up.
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Vaša elektrana može eksplodirati.
08:15
And neither your operators nor your safety system will notice it.
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A ni vaši operateri niti vaš sigurnosni sistem neće to uočiti.
08:18
That's scary.
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To je strašno.
08:20
But it gets worse.
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I postaje još gore.
08:22
And this is very important, what I'm going to say.
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Ovo što ću sada reći jako je bitno.
08:25
Think about this:
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Razmislite o ovome:
08:27
this attack is generic.
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ovaj napad je opći.
08:30
It doesn't have anything to do, in specifics,
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Nema neke konkretne veze
08:34
with centrifuges,
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sa centrifugama
08:36
with uranium enrichment.
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niti s obogaćivanjem urana.
08:39
So it would work as well, for example,
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Tako da bi mogao funkcionirao, na primjer,
08:42
in a power plant
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u elektrani
08:44
or in an automobile factory.
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ili u automobilskoj tvornici.
08:47
It is generic.
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On je opći.
08:49
And you don't have -- as an attacker --
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Ne morate -- kao napadač --
08:51
you don't have to deliver this payload
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dostaviti virus
08:54
by a USB stick,
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preko USB stick-a
08:56
as we saw it in the case of Stuxnet.
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kao u slučaju Stuxneta.
08:58
You could also use conventional worm technology for spreading.
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Možete koristiti i uobičajenu metodu zaraze računala putem crva.
09:01
Just spread it as wide as possible.
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Samo ga proširite što je više moguće.
09:04
And if you do that,
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Ako to učinite,
09:06
what you end up with
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kao rezultat dobit ćete
09:08
is a cyber weapon of mass destruction.
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virtualno oružje za masovno uništenje.
09:14
That's the consequence
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To je posljedica
09:16
that we have to face.
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s kojom se moramo suočiti.
09:19
So unfortunately,
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Tako da nažalost,
09:22
the biggest number of targets for such attacks
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najveći broj meta za takve napade
09:25
are not in the Middle East.
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nije na Bliskom Istoku.
09:27
They're in the United States and Europe and in Japan.
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One su u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama, Europi i Japanu.
09:30
So all of the green areas,
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Sva zelena područja,
09:32
these are your target-rich environments.
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to su vaše mete.
09:35
We have to face the consequences,
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Moramo se součiti s posljedicama,
09:38
and we better start to prepare right now.
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i bolje nam je da se odmah pripremimo na njih.
09:41
Thanks.
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Hvala.
09:43
(Applause)
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(Pljesak)
09:49
Chris Anderson: I've got a question.
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Chris Anderson: Imam pitanje.
09:53
Ralph, it's been quite widely reported
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Ralph, poprilično je zastupljeno mišljenje,
09:55
that people assume that Mossad
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ljudi pretpostavljaju da se Mossad
09:57
is the main entity behind this.
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krije iza svega.
09:59
Is that your opinion?
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Dijelite li i Vi to mišljenje?
10:02
Ralph Langner: Okay, you really want to hear that?
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Ralph Langner: U redu, stvarno želite čuti?
10:04
Yeah. Okay.
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Da, onda uredu.
10:06
My opinion is that the Mossad is involved,
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Moje mišljenje je da Mossad je umiješan,
10:09
but that the leading force is not Israel.
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ali Izrael nije vodeća sila.
10:12
So the leading force behind that
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Vodeća sila koja stoji iza svega
10:14
is the cyber superpower.
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je virtualna supersila.
10:17
There is only one,
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Samo je jedna takva,
10:19
and that's the United States --
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Sjedinjene Američke Države --
10:21
fortunately, fortunately.
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na sreću.
10:23
Because otherwise,
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U protivnom
10:25
our problems would even be bigger.
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naši bi problemi bili još veći.
10:28
CA: Thank you for scaring the living daylights out of us. Thank you, Ralph.
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CA: Hvala vam što ste nas tako isprepadali. Hvala, Ralph.
10:32
(Applause)
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(Pljesak)
ABOUT THE SPEAKER
Ralph Langner - Security consultantRalph Langner is a German control system security consultant. He has received worldwide recognition for his analysis of the Stuxnet malware.
Why you should listen
Ralph Langner heads Langner, an independent cyber-security firm that specializes in control systems -- electronic devices that monitor and regulate other devices, such as manufacturing equipment. These devices' deep connection to the infrastructure that runs our cities and countries has made them, increasingly, the targets of an emerging, highly sophisticated type of cyber-warfare. And since 2010, when the Stuxnet computer worm first reared its head, Langner has stood squarely in the middle of the battlefield.
As part of a global effort to decode the mysterious program, Langner and his team analyzed Stuxnet's data structures, and revealed what he believes to be its ultimate intent: the control system software known to run centrifuges in nuclear facilities -- specifically, facilities in Iran. Further analysis by Langner uncovered what seem to be Stuxnet's shocking origins, which he revealed in his TED2011 talk. (PS: He was right.)
Ralph Langner | Speaker | TED.com