TED2011
Ralph Langner: Cracking Stuxnet, a 21st-century cyber weapon
拉尔夫·兰纳：破解二十一世纪的网络武器--震网病毒
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2010年初次发现震网电脑蠕虫时，它就给我们出了个难题。在它不寻常的高度复杂性后隐约地呈现出一个更令人不安的谜团：它的目的。拉尔夫·兰纳和他的团队协助破解了代码，其中揭露了这一数字敌人的最终目标 -- 及它隐秘的来源。在数字取证这一奇妙的表象下，他阐述了他们是如何做到的。
Ralph Langner - Security consultant
Ralph Langner is a German control system security consultant. He has received worldwide recognition for his analysis of the Stuxnet malware. Full bio
Ralph Langner is a German control system security consultant. He has received worldwide recognition for his analysis of the Stuxnet malware. Full bio
Double-click the English transcript below to play the video.
00:15
The idea behind the Stuxnet computer worm
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震网电脑蠕虫背后的思想
00:18
is actually quite simple.
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其实非常简单。
00:20
We don't want Iran to get the bomb.
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我们不希望伊朗拥有核武器。
00:23
Their major asset for developing nuclear weapons
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他们用于开发核武器的主要设备
00:26
is the Natanz uranium enrichment facility.
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是纳坦兹的铀浓缩设施。
00:30
The gray boxes that you see,
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各位看到的灰盒子
00:32
these are real-time control systems.
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是实时控制系统。
00:35
Now if we manage to compromise these systems
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如果我们设法侵入这些
00:38
that control drive speeds and valves,
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控制驱动器的速度和阀门的系统中，
00:41
we can actually cause a lot of problems
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我们实际上可以用离心机
00:44
with the centrifuge.
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造成很多问题。
00:46
The gray boxes don't run Windows software;
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这个灰盒子不能运行Windows软件；
00:48
they are a completely different technology.
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它们用的是完全不同的技术。
00:51
But if we manage
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但如果我们设法
00:53
to place a good Windows virus
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把一个Windows病毒
00:56
on a notebook
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放到一名
00:58
that is used by a maintenance engineer
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设备工程师用于配置
01:00
to configure this gray box,
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这个灰盒子的笔记本上，
01:03
then we are in business.
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然后我们就可以开始行动了。
01:05
And this is the plot behind Stuxnet.
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这就是震网病毒背后的阴谋。
01:08
So we start with a Windows dropper.
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那么我从一个Windows注入器开始。
01:13
The payload goes onto the gray box,
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它携带的病毒传播到灰盒子，
01:16
damages the centrifuge,
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破坏离心机，
01:18
and the Iranian nuclear program is delayed --
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伊朗核项目延迟 --
01:20
mission accomplished.
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任务完成。
01:22
That's easy, huh?
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很容易，是吧？
01:24
I want to tell you how we found that out.
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我想告诉大家我们是如何发现这些的。
01:27
When we started our research on Stuxnet six months ago,
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当六个月前我们开始研究震网病毒时，
01:30
it was completely unknown what the purpose of this thing was.
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我们对它的目的一无所知。
01:33
The only thing that was known
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唯一知道的是，
01:35
is it's very, very complex on the Windows part, the dropper part,
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它的Windows部分，注入器部分非常非常复杂，
01:38
used multiple zero-day vulnerabilities.
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使用了多重零日漏洞攻击。
01:41
And it seemed to want to do something
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它似乎想要对
01:44
with these gray boxes, these real-time control systems.
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这些灰盒子，这些实时控制系统做些什么。
01:46
So that got our attention,
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这引起了我们的注意，
01:48
and we started a lab project
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我们启动了一个实验室项目，
01:50
where we infected our environment with Stuxnet
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用震网病毒感染我们的系统，
01:54
and checked this thing out.
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并进行了仔细的检查。
01:56
And then some very funny things happened.
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接着一些非常有趣的事发生了。
01:59
Stuxnet behaved like a lab rat
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震网病毒表现的像只
02:02
that didn't like our cheese --
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不喜欢起司的大白鼠 --
02:05
sniffed, but didn't want to eat.
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嗅一嗅起司，但并不想吃。
02:07
Didn't make sense to me.
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我有些不理解。
02:09
And after we experimented with different flavors of cheese,
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而在我们实验了各种不同的起司之后，
02:12
I realized, well, this is a directed attack.
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我意识到，这是一个定向攻击。
02:16
It's completely directed.
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它完全是定向的。
02:18
The dropper is prowling actively
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如果找到了特定的配置，
02:20
on the gray box
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注入器就会
02:22
if a specific configuration is found,
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主动潜入灰盒子里，
02:25
and even if the actual program code that it's trying to infect
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即使它正试图感染的实际的程序
02:29
is actually running on that target.
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也在干着同样的事儿。
02:31
And if not, Stuxnet does nothing.
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如果没有找到目标，震网病毒什么也不做。
02:34
So that really got my attention,
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这确实引起了我的注意，
02:36
and we started to work on this
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我们开始昼夜不停的
02:38
nearly around the clock,
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对这个进行研究，
02:40
because I thought, "Well, we don't know what the target is.
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因为我觉得我们还不知道它的目标呢。
02:43
It could be, let's say for example,
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目标也许是，打个比方，
02:45
a U.S. power plant,
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一座美国发电厂，
02:47
or a chemical plant in Germany.
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或德国的化工厂。
02:49
So we better find out what the target is soon."
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因此我们最好尽快找出它的目标。
02:52
So we extracted and decompiled
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我们提取并反编译了
02:54
the attack code,
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攻击代码，
02:56
and we discovered that it's structured in two digital bombs --
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发现它包含两个数字炸弹 --
02:59
a smaller one and a bigger one.
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一个小些的和一个大些的。
03:02
And we also saw that they are very professionally engineered
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而我们也发现，它们是被了解所有内幕信息的人
03:06
by people who obviously had all insider information.
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非常专业地制作出来的。
03:10
They knew all the bits and bites
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他们了解所要攻击
03:12
that they had to attack.
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目标的所有细节。
03:14
They probably even know the shoe size of the operator.
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他们甚至知道操作员鞋子的号码。
03:17
So they know everything.
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他们知道一切。
03:19
And if you have heard that the dropper of Stuxnet
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如果各位曾经听说过，震网病毒的注入器
03:22
is complex and high-tech,
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复杂且是高科技的，
03:24
let me tell you this:
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让我告诉各位：
03:26
the payload is rocket science.
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它携带的病毒非常复杂。
03:28
It's way above everything
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这远超过我们
03:30
that we have ever seen before.
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曾经见过的技术。
03:33
Here you see a sample of this actual attack code.
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在这儿各位能看到实际的攻击代码的片段。
03:36
We are talking about --
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我们在讨论 --
03:38
around about 15,000 lines of code.
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大约1万5千行代码。
03:41
Looks pretty much like old-style assembly language.
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看起来很像旧式的汇编语言。
03:44
And I want to tell you how we were able
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我想告诉各位我们是
03:46
to make sense out of this code.
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如何弄明白这些代码的。
03:48
So what we were looking for is, first of all, system function calls,
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我们首先要寻找的是系统函数调用，
03:51
because we know what they do.
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因为我们知道这些函数做什么。
03:53
And then we were looking for timers and data structures
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然后我们要找到定时器和数据结构，
03:57
and trying to relate them to the real world --
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接着尝试把它们和现实世界联系起来 --
03:59
to potential real world targets.
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与潜在的现实世界目标联系起来。
04:01
So we do need target theories
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因此我们需要目标理论
04:04
that we can prove or disprove.
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我们能用它来证实与否。
04:07
In order to get target theories,
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为了得到目标理论，
04:09
we remember
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我们记得
04:11
that it's definitely hardcore sabotage,
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这绝对会造成严重的破坏，
04:13
it must be a high-value target
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因此必然有个高价值的目标，
04:15
and it is most likely located in Iran,
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而且很有可能就位于伊朗境内，
04:18
because that's where most of the infections had been reported.
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因为在伊朗报告的病毒感染最多。
04:22
Now you don't find several thousand targets in that area.
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在这一区域并不会发现许多目标。
04:25
It basically boils down
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基本上可以把目标缩小至
04:27
to the Bushehr nuclear power plant
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布歇赫尔核电厂
04:29
and to the Natanz fuel enrichment plant.
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和纳坦兹的铀浓缩厂。
04:31
So I told my assistant,
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因此我对我的助理说，
04:33
"Get me a list of all centrifuge and power plant experts from our client base."
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“给我一个包含我们客户群中所有离心机和发电厂专家的列表。”
04:36
And I phoned them up and picked their brain
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我跟他们通了电话，让他们
04:38
in an effort to match their expertise
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用他们的专业知识帮忙
04:40
with what we found in code and data.
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分析我们在代码和数据中的发现。
04:43
And that worked pretty well.
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这非常管用。
04:45
So we were able to associate
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我们能把这个小的
04:47
the small digital warhead
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数字弹头与转子控制器
04:49
with the rotor control.
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联系起来了。
04:51
The rotor is that moving part within the centrifuge,
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这个转子是离心机内部的运动机件，
04:54
that black object that you see.
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就是各位看到的那个黑色物体。
04:56
And if you manipulate the speed of this rotor,
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如果控制这个转子的速度，
04:59
you are actually able to crack the rotor
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实际上就能破解转子
05:01
and eventually even have the centrifuge explode.
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并甚至最终能让离心机爆炸。
05:05
What we also saw
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我们也看到了
05:07
is that the goal of the attack
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攻击的目的
05:09
was really to do it slowly and creepy --
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是让这一切令人恐怖的事缓慢地发生--
05:12
obviously in an effort
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显然这会
05:14
to drive maintenance engineers crazy,
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让维护工程师们发疯，
05:17
that they would not be able to figure this out quickly.
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他们不可能很快找出问题所在。
05:20
The big digital warhead -- we had a shot at this
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大的数字弹头 -- 通过仔细地
05:23
by looking very closely
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观察数据和数据结构，
05:25
at data and data structures.
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我们有机会对它有所了解。
05:27
So for example, the number 164
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例如，数字164
05:29
really stands out in that code;
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在这些代码中非常引人注目；
05:31
you can't overlook it.
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不可能忽略它。
05:33
I started to research scientific literature
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我开始研究与这些分离机
05:35
on how these centrifuges
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如何被建造在纳坦兹
05:37
are actually built in Natanz
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有关的科学文献，
05:39
and found they are structured
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并发现它们被组织在
05:41
in what is called a cascade,
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一个被称为层级的东西之中，
05:43
and each cascade holds 164 centrifuges.
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每个层级包含164个离心机。
05:47
So that made sense, that was a match.
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这有点清楚了，匹配起来了。
05:49
And it even got better.
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甚至更好地匹配了。
05:51
These centrifuges in Iran
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在伊朗的这些离心机
05:53
are subdivided into 15, what is called, stages.
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被分成15个所谓的机组。
05:57
And guess what we found in the attack code?
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猜测我们在攻击代码中发现了什么？
05:59
An almost identical structure.
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一个几乎完全相同的机组结构。
06:01
So again, that was a real good match.
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因此，再一次地很好地匹配上了。
06:04
And this gave us very high confidence for what we were looking at.
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这在我们所进行的工作上给了我们更多自信。
06:07
Now don't get me wrong here, it didn't go like this.
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现在别误会我，它不是像这样进行的。
06:10
These results have been obtained
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这些结果中包含了
06:13
over several weeks of really hard labor.
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我们数周的辛苦劳动。
06:16
And we often went into just a dead end
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我们常常走入死胡同
06:19
and had to recover.
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并回到起点。
06:21
Anyway, so we figured out
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总之，我们找出了
06:23
that both digital warheads
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这两个从不同角度
06:25
were actually aiming at one and the same target,
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瞄准着同一个目标的
06:27
but from different angles.
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数字弹头。
06:29
The small warhead is taking one cascade,
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小弹头选择一个层级，
06:32
and spinning up the rotors and slowing them down,
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旋转加速转子，接着让它们慢下来，
06:35
and the big warhead
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然后大弹头
06:37
is talking to six cascades
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选择六个层级
06:39
and manipulating valves.
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并操控阀门。
06:41
So in all, we are very confident
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总的来说，我们非常自信
06:43
that we have actually determined what the target is.
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我们确定了目标是什么。
06:45
It is Natanz, and it is only Natanz.
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就是纳坦兹，只可能是纳坦兹。
06:48
So we don't have to worry
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我们并不担心
06:50
that other targets
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其他可能被震网病毒
06:52
might be hit by Stuxnet.
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要攻击的目标。
06:54
Here's some very cool stuff that we saw --
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有些我们看到的非常酷的东西 --
06:57
really knocked my socks off.
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确实让我大吃一惊的东西。
06:59
Down there is the gray box,
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这儿下面是灰盒子，
07:01
and on the top you see the centrifuges.
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在上面看到的是离心机。
07:04
Now what this thing does
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事情是这样的，
07:06
is it intercepts the input values from sensors --
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它拦截了从传感器发送来的输入值--
07:09
so for example, from pressure sensors
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例如，来自压力传感器
07:11
and vibration sensors --
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和震动传感器的输入值 --
07:13
and it provides legitimate program code,
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并提供合法的代码，
07:16
which is still running during the attack,
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这代码会在攻击期间仍然保持运行，
07:18
with fake input data.
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随代码一起的还有假的输入数据。
07:20
And as a matter of fact, this fake input data
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事实上，这假的输入数据
07:22
is actually prerecorded by Stuxnet.
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是震网病毒事先预存的。
07:25
So it's just like from the Hollywood movies
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正如好莱坞电影
07:27
where during the heist,
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中的抢劫片段，
07:29
the observation camera is fed with prerecorded video.
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观察摄像头被连上了事先录制好的视频。
07:32
That's cool, huh?
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很酷，不是么？
07:35
The idea here is obviously
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它的打算显然
07:37
not only to fool the operators in the control room.
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不仅是要愚弄控制室中的操作员。
07:40
It actually is much more dangerous and aggressive.
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它实际上要更危险，更具侵略性。
07:44
The idea
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它的打算
07:46
is to circumvent a digital safety system.
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是要绕过数字安全系统。
07:50
We need digital safety systems
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我们需要数字安全系统
07:52
where a human operator could not act quick enough.
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在那些人类操作员不能做出足够快的行动的地方。
07:55
So for example, in a power plant,
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例如，在发电厂，
07:57
when your big steam turbine gets too over speed,
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当巨大的蒸汽轮机转速过快时，
08:00
you must open relief valves within a millisecond.
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必须在一毫秒内打开安全阀。
08:03
Obviously, this cannot be done by a human operator.
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显然，人类操作员不可能做到。
08:06
So this is where we need digital safety systems.
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因此，在这儿就需要数字安全系统。
08:08
And when they are compromised,
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而当它们受到损害时，
08:10
then real bad things can happen.
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真正的问题就会出现。
08:13
Your plant can blow up.
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电厂会爆炸。
08:15
And neither your operators nor your safety system will notice it.
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操作员和安全系统都不会注意到。
08:18
That's scary.
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这很可怕。
08:20
But it gets worse.
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但还会更糟。
08:22
And this is very important, what I'm going to say.
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我将要说到的，非常重要。
08:25
Think about this:
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想想这个。
08:27
this attack is generic.
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这种攻击是通用的。
08:30
It doesn't have anything to do, in specifics,
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它不需要对离心机，
08:34
with centrifuges,
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对铀浓缩做什么
08:36
with uranium enrichment.
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具体的事情。
08:39
So it would work as well, for example,
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它也将发挥作用，例如，
08:42
in a power plant
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在一个发电厂
08:44
or in an automobile factory.
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或是一个汽车制造厂。
08:47
It is generic.
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这很普通。
08:49
And you don't have -- as an attacker --
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作为一名攻击者，你不需要 --
08:51
you don't have to deliver this payload
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不需要用U盘把病毒
08:54
by a USB stick,
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传播出去，
08:56
as we saw it in the case of Stuxnet.
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如我们在震网病毒这一案例中看到的那样。
08:58
You could also use conventional worm technology for spreading.
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你也可以用传统的蠕虫技术进行传播。
09:01
Just spread it as wide as possible.
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尽可能广泛地传播它。
09:04
And if you do that,
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如果做到了这些
09:06
what you end up with
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最终就会拥有
09:08
is a cyber weapon of mass destruction.
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一个大规模杀伤性的网络武器。
09:14
That's the consequence
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这就是我们不得不
09:16
that we have to face.
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面对的后果。
09:19
So unfortunately,
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不幸地是，
09:22
the biggest number of targets for such attacks
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这类攻击数量最多的目标
09:25
are not in the Middle East.
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不是在中东。
09:27
They're in the United States and Europe and in Japan.
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而是在美国、欧洲和日本。
09:30
So all of the green areas,
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所有这些绿色的区域，
09:32
these are your target-rich environments.
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这些是目标密集的区域。
09:35
We have to face the consequences,
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我们不得不面对这些后果，
09:38
and we better start to prepare right now.
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我们最好立即开始做准备。
09:41
Thanks.
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谢谢。
09:43
(Applause)
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（掌声）
09:49
Chris Anderson: I've got a question.
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克里斯·安德森：我有个问题。
09:53
Ralph, it's been quite widely reported
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拉尔夫，广为流传
09:55
that people assume that Mossad
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人们认为摩萨德
09:57
is the main entity behind this.
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是幕后主使。
09:59
Is that your opinion?
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你怎么看？
10:02
Ralph Langner: Okay, you really want to hear that?
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拉尔夫·兰纳：好的，你真的想知道？
10:04
Yeah. Okay.
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是的，好吧。
10:06
My opinion is that the Mossad is involved,
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我认为摩萨德牵涉其中，
10:09
but that the leading force is not Israel.
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但主导力量不是以色列。
10:12
So the leading force behind that
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其后的主导力量
10:14
is the cyber superpower.
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是网络超级大国。
10:17
There is only one,
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只有一个，
10:19
and that's the United States --
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那就是美国 --
10:21
fortunately, fortunately.
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很幸运，很幸运。
10:23
Because otherwise,
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因为否则的话，
10:25
our problems would even be bigger.
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我们面临的问题就更加严重了。
10:28
CA: Thank you for scaring the living daylights out of us. Thank you, Ralph.
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克里斯：谢谢你吓了我们一大跳，谢谢你，拉尔夫。
10:32
(Applause)
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（掌声）
ABOUT THE SPEAKER
Ralph Langner - Security consultantRalph Langner is a German control system security consultant. He has received worldwide recognition for his analysis of the Stuxnet malware.
Why you should listen
Ralph Langner heads Langner, an independent cyber-security firm that specializes in control systems -- electronic devices that monitor and regulate other devices, such as manufacturing equipment. These devices' deep connection to the infrastructure that runs our cities and countries has made them, increasingly, the targets of an emerging, highly sophisticated type of cyber-warfare. And since 2010, when the Stuxnet computer worm first reared its head, Langner has stood squarely in the middle of the battlefield.
As part of a global effort to decode the mysterious program, Langner and his team analyzed Stuxnet's data structures, and revealed what he believes to be its ultimate intent: the control system software known to run centrifuges in nuclear facilities -- specifically, facilities in Iran. Further analysis by Langner uncovered what seem to be Stuxnet's shocking origins, which he revealed in his TED2011 talk. (PS: He was right.)
Ralph Langner | Speaker | TED.com