TEDGlobal 2010
Julian Assange: Why the world needs WikiLeaks
Julian Assange: Hvorfor verden har brug for WikiLeaks
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Det kontroversielle website WikiLeaks samler og offentliggør yderst fortrolige dokumenter og videoer. Grundlæggeren Julian Assange, der angiveligt ønskes til afhøring af de amerikanske autoriteter, taler med TEDs Chris Anderson om, hvordan siden opererer, hvad den har opnået og hvad der driver ham. Interviewet indeholder et videoklip af et nyligt amerikansk luftangreb i Bagdad.
Julian Assange - Whistleblower
Internet activist Julian Assange serves as spokesperson for WikiLeaks, a controversial, volunteer-driven website that publishes and comments on leaked documents alleging government and corporate misconduct. Full bio
Internet activist Julian Assange serves as spokesperson for WikiLeaks, a controversial, volunteer-driven website that publishes and comments on leaked documents alleging government and corporate misconduct. Full bio
Double-click the English transcript below to play the video.
00:15
Chris Anderson: Julian, welcome.
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Velkommen Julian!
00:17
It's been reported that WikiLeaks, your baby,
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Det forlyder at WikiLeaks, din baby,
00:19
has, in the last few years
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i løbet af de sidste få år
00:21
has released more classified documents
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har offentliggjort flere fortrolige dokumenter
00:24
than the rest of the world's media combined.
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end resten af verdens medier samlet set.
00:26
Can that possibly be true?
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Kan det virkeligt være sandt?
00:28
Julian Assange: Yeah, can it possibly be true?
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Jeps, kan det virkeligt være sandt?
00:30
It's a worry -- isn't it? -- that the rest of the world's media
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Det er bekymrende, ikke? At resten af verdens medier
00:33
is doing such a bad job
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laver så dårligt et arbejde,
00:35
that a little group of activists
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at en lille gruppe aktivister
00:37
is able to release more
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er i stand til at offentliggøre mere
00:39
of that type of information
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af den type information,
00:41
than the rest of the world press combined.
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end resten af den samlede verdenspresse.
00:43
CA: How does it work?
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Hvordan foregår det?
00:45
How do people release the documents?
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Hvordan offentliggør folk dokumenterne?
00:48
And how do you secure their privacy?
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Og hvordan sikrer I jer deres anonymitet?
00:51
JA: So these are -- as far as we can tell --
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Disse folk er, så vidt vi kan se,
00:53
classical whistleblowers,
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klassiske fløjteblæsere.
00:55
and we have a number of ways for them
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Og vi har flere muligheder for dem
00:57
to get information to us.
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til at give information til os.
00:59
So we use this state-of-the-art encryption
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Så vi benytter kun den ypperste kryptering
01:01
to bounce stuff around the Internet, to hide trails,
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til at sende ting rundt på internettet, til at skjule spor,
01:03
pass it through legal jurisdictions
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kører dem igennem jurisdiktioner
01:05
like Sweden and Belgium
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som Sverige eller Belgien
01:08
to enact those legal protections.
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for at retsbeskyttelse træder i kraft.
01:12
We get information in the mail,
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Vi får information i posten,
01:14
the regular postal mail,
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den almindelige post,
01:17
encrypted or not,
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krypteret eller ikke
01:19
vet it like a regular news organization, format it --
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verificerer den, ligesom et almindeligt nyhedsbureau,
01:22
which is sometimes something that's quite hard to do,
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hvilket nogen gange er noget, der er ret svært at gøre,
01:25
when you're talking about
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når man snakker om
01:27
giant databases of information --
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gigantiske databaser med informationer,
01:29
release it to the public
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offentliggør den
01:31
and then defend ourselves
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og forsvarer så os selv
01:33
against the inevitable legal and political attacks.
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imod de uundgåelige retslige og politiske angreb.
01:36
CA: So you make an effort to ensure
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Så I forsøger at sikre,
01:38
the documents are legitimate,
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at dokumenterne er ægte.
01:40
but you actually
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Men I kender faktisk
01:42
almost never know who the identity of the source is?
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næsten aldrig kildens identitet.
01:45
JA: That's right, yeah. Very rarely do we ever know,
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Det er rigtigt jeps. Det er meget sjældent vi kender den.
01:49
and if we find out at some stage
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Og hvis vi på et tidspunkt finder ud af det,
01:52
then we destroy that information as soon as possible.
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så tilintetgør vi den information hurtigst muligt.
01:55
(Phone ring) God damn it.
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(Telefon ringer) Fandens også!
01:57
(Laughter)
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(Latter)
02:01
CA: I think that's the CIA asking what the code is
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Jeg tror, det er CIA, der vil vide, hvad koden er
02:03
for a TED membership.
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til et TED medlemsskab.
02:05
(Laughter)
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(Latter)
02:08
So let's take [an] example, actually.
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Så lad os tage et egentligt eksempel.
02:10
This is something
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Det her er noget,
02:12
you leaked a few years ago.
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I lækkede for nogle få år siden.
02:14
If we can have this document up ...
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Hvis vi kan få dokumentet vist...
02:16
So this was a story in Kenya a few years ago.
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Det her var en sag i Kenya for nogle få år siden.
02:18
Can you tell us what you leaked and what happened?
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Vil du fortælle os, hvad I lækkede og hvad der skete?
02:21
JA: So this is the Kroll Report.
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Det her er Kroll Rapporten.
02:23
This was a secret intelligence report
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Det var en hemmelig efterretningsrapport,
02:26
commissioned by the Kenyan government
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bestilt af den kenyanske regering
02:28
after its election in 2004.
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efter dens valg i 2004.
02:31
Prior to 2004, Kenya was ruled
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Før 2004 blev Kenya regeret
02:33
by Daniel arap Moi
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af Daniel arap Moi
02:35
for about 18 years.
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i omkring 18 år.
02:37
He was a soft dictator of Kenya.
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Han var en blød diktator i Kenya.
02:40
And when Kibaki got into power --
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Og da Kibaki fik magten
02:42
through a coalition of forces that were trying
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gennem en magtkoalition, der prøvede
02:44
to clean up corruption in Kenya --
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at rydde op i korruptionen i Kenya,
02:46
they commissioned this report,
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bestilte de denne rapport,
02:48
spent about two million pounds
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brugte omkring 2 millioner pund
02:50
on this and an associated report.
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på dén og en associeret rapport.
02:52
And then the government sat on it
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Og så forvarede regeringen den
02:55
and used it for political leverage on Moi,
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og brugte den til politisk indflydelse på Moi,
02:57
who was the richest man --
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som var den rigeste mand,
02:59
still is the richest man -- in Kenya.
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stadig er den rigeste mand, i Kenya.
03:02
It's the Holy Grail of Kenyan journalism.
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Den er kenyansk journalistiks hellige gral.
03:05
So I went there in 2007,
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Så jeg rejste derned i 2007,
03:08
and we managed to get hold of this
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og vi klarede at få fat i den
03:10
just prior to the election --
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lige før valget;
03:12
the national election, December 28.
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regeringsvalget den 28. december.
03:17
When we released that report,
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Da vi offentliggjorde rapporten,
03:20
we did so three days after the new president, Kibaki,
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det gjorde vi 3 dage efter, at den nye præsident Kibaki
03:23
had decided to pal up with
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havde besluttet at blive venner med
03:25
the man that he was going to clean out,
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manden, han ville blanke af,
03:27
Daniel arap Moi,
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Daniel arap Moi.
03:29
so this report then
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Så denne rapport
03:32
became a dead albatross
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blev en klods om benet
03:34
around President Kibaki's neck.
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på præsident Kibaki.
03:38
CA: And -- I mean, to cut a long story short --
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Og jeg mener, for at gøre en lang historie kort,
03:41
word of the report leaked into Kenya,
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at rygter om rapporten lækkede ind i Kenya,
03:44
not from the official media, but indirectly,
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ikke via de officielle medier, men indirekte.
03:47
and in your opinion, it actually shifted the election.
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Og efter din mening ændrede det faktisk valgresultatet.
03:50
JA: Yeah. So this became front page of the Guardian
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Jeps! Det blev forsidestof i the Guardian
03:53
and was then printed in all the surrounding countries of Kenya,
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og blev derefter trykt i alle Kenyas nabolande,
03:56
in Tanzanian and South African press.
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i Tanzania og i den sydafrikanske presse.
03:59
And so it came in from the outside.
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Og sådan kom det ind udefra.
04:01
And that, after a couple of days,
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Og det gjorde, efter et par dage,
04:03
made the Kenyan press feel safe to talk about it.
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at den kenyanske presse følte sig trygge ved at tale om det.
04:05
And it ran for 20 nights straight on Kenyan TV,
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Det kørte 20 aftener i træk på kenyansk tv,
04:08
shifted the vote by 10 percent,
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flyttede 10 procent af stemmerne,
04:11
according to a Kenyan intelligence report,
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ifølge en kenyansk efterretningsrapport,
04:13
which changed the result of the election.
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hvilket ændrede valgresultatet.
04:15
CA: Wow, so your leak
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Wauw, så jeres lækage
04:17
really substantially changed the world?
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ændrede faktisk verden væsenligt?
04:19
JA: Yep.
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Jep!
04:21
(Applause)
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(Bifald)
04:25
CA: Here's -- We're going to just show
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Her er... Vi viser blot
04:27
a short clip from this
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et kort klip fra denne
04:30
Baghdad airstrike video.
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video af et luftangreb på Bagdad.
04:32
The video itself is longer,
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Videoen er længere.
04:34
but here's a short clip.
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Men her er et kort klip.
04:36
This is -- this is intense material, I should warn you.
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Jeg bør advare jer om, at det er voldsomme scener.
04:39
Radio: ... just fuckin', once you get on 'em just open 'em up.
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...bare fucking. Når først du har dem, så bare åben dem op.
04:42
I see your element, uh, got about four Humvees, uh, out along ...
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Jeg kan se dit mål, uh, har omkring 4 Humvee'er, uh, ude ved...
04:46
You're clear. All right. Firing.
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Du er fri. All right. Skyd.
04:49
Let me know when you've got them. Let's shoot.
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Sig til, når du har fået dem. Lad os skyde.
04:52
Light 'em all up.
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Sæt ild på dem.
04:54
C'mon, fire!
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Kom så, fyr!
04:56
(Machine gun fire)
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(Salve fra maskingevær)
04:59
Keep shoot 'n. Keep shoot 'n.
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Bliv ved at skyde. Bliv ved at skyde.
05:02
(Machine gun fire)
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(Salve fra maskingevær)
05:05
Keep shoot 'n.
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Bliv ved at skyde.
05:08
Hotel ... Bushmaster Two-Six, Bushmaster Two-Six,
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Hotel... Bushmaster 2-6, Bushmaster 2-6,
05:10
we need to move, time now!
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vi er nødt til at rykke videre, nu!
05:12
All right, we just engaged all eight individuals.
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All right, vi angreb lige alle 8 individer.
05:15
Yeah, we see two birds [helicopters], and we're still firing.
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Jeps, vi kan se to fugle og vi skyder stadig.
05:18
Roger. I got 'em.
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Roger. Jeg fik dem.
05:20
Two-Six, this is Two-Six, we're mobile.
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2-6, dette er 2-6, vi er mobile.
05:22
Oops, I'm sorry. What was going on?
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Ups, jeg beklager. Hvad skete der?
05:24
God damn it, Kyle. All right, hahaha. I hit 'em.
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For fanden da Kyle. All right. (Latter) Jeg fik dem.
05:29
CA: So, what was the impact of that?
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Så hvilken indvirkning fik det?
05:32
JA: The impact on the people who worked on it
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Indvirkningen på de mennesker, der arbejdede med det,
05:35
was severe.
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var voldsom.
05:37
We ended up sending two people to Baghdad
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Vi endte med at sende to folk til Bagdad
05:39
to further research that story.
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for at researche videre på den historie.
05:41
So this is just the first of three attacks
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Dette er blot det første af tre angreb,
05:44
that occurred in that scene.
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der forekommer i den scene.
05:46
CA: So, I mean, 11 people died in that attack, right,
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Så jeg mener, 11 mennesker døde i det angreb, ikke?
05:48
including two Reuters employees?
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Inklusiv to Reuters ansatte?
05:50
JA: Yeah. Two Reuters employees,
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Jeps! To Reuters ansatte,
05:52
two young children were wounded.
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to små børn blev sårede.
05:55
There were between 18 and 26 people killed all together.
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Der blev dræbt mellem 18 og 26 mennesker i alt.
05:58
CA: And releasing this caused
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Og at offentliggøre dette forårsagede
06:00
widespread outrage.
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stor skandale.
06:02
What was the key element of this
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Hvad var det centrale element i dette,
06:04
that actually caused the outrage, do you think?
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det der egentligt forårsagede skandalen, tror du?
06:07
JA: I don't know. I guess people can see
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Det ved jeg ikke, jeg tror, folk kan se
06:09
the gross disparity in force.
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den voldsomme ulighed i magt.
06:12
You have guys walking in a relaxed way down the street,
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Man har nogle fyre, der på en afslappet måde går ned ad gaden
06:14
and then an Apache helicopter sitting up at one kilometer
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og så en Apache helikopter, der hænger i en kilometers højde
06:17
firing 30-millimeter cannon shells
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og fyrer 30mm-projektiler af
06:19
on everyone --
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mod alle -
06:21
looking for any excuse to do so --
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de bruger enhver undskyldning -
06:24
and killing people rescuing the wounded.
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og slår folk ihjel, der hjælper de sårede.
06:26
And there was two journalists involved that clearly weren't insurgents
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Og to journalister, der åbenlyst ikke var oprører,
06:29
because that's their full-time job.
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blev involverede.
06:33
CA: I mean, there's been this U.S. intelligence analyst,
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Jeg mener, denne her USA efterretningsanalytiker
06:36
Bradley Manning, arrested,
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Bradley Manning er blevet arresteret.
06:38
and it's alleged that he confessed in a chat room
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Og det påstås, at han i et chatrum indrømmede
06:41
to have leaked this video to you,
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at have lækket denne video til jer
06:44
along with 280,000
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sammen med 280.000
06:46
classified U.S. embassy cables.
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fortrolige telegrammer fra amerikanske ambassader.
06:48
I mean, did he?
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Jeg mener; gjorde han det?
06:51
JA: We have denied receiving those cables.
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Altså, vi har nægtet at have modtaget de telegrammer.
06:53
He has been charged,
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Han er blevet anklaget,
06:55
about five days ago,
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for omkring 5 dage siden,
06:57
with obtaining 150,000 cables
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for at have fået fat i 150.000 telegrammer
07:00
and releasing 50.
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og offentliggøre 50.
07:02
Now, we had released,
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Se, vi offentliggjorde,
07:05
early in the year,
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tidligt på året,
07:07
a cable from the Reykjavik U.S. embassy,
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et telegram fra den amerikanske ambassade i Reykjavik.
07:11
but this is not necessarily connected.
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Men der er ikke nødvendigvis nogen sammenhæng.
07:13
I mean, I was a known visitor of that embassy.
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Jeg mener, jeg var en kendt gæst på den ambassade.
07:15
CA: I mean, if you did receive thousands
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Jeg mener, hvis I havde modtaget tusinder
07:17
of U.S. embassy diplomatic cables ...
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af diplomat-telegrammer fra amerikanske ambassader...
07:20
JA: We would have released them. (CA: You would?)
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Så ville vi have offentliggjort dem. Ville I?
07:22
JA: Yeah. (CA: Because?)
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Jeps! Fordi?
07:25
JA: Well, because these sort of things
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Altså, fordi den slags ting
07:27
reveal what the true state
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afslører sandheden
07:30
of, say,
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om f.eks.
07:32
Arab governments are like,
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arabiske regeringer;
07:34
the true human-rights abuses in those governments.
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sandheden om menneskerettighedskrænkelser i disse styrer.
07:37
If you look at declassified cables,
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Hvis du ser på frigivne telegrammer,
07:39
that's the sort of material that's there.
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så er det den slags, man ser.
07:41
CA: So let's talk a little more broadly about this.
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Lad os tale lidt bredere om dette.
07:43
I mean, in general, what's your philosophy?
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Jeg mener - generelt - hvad er jeres filosofi?
07:45
Why is it right
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Hvorfor er det rigtigt,
07:47
to encourage leaking of secret information?
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at opmuntre til at lække hemmelig information?
07:51
JA: Well, there's a question as to what sort of information is important in the world,
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Altså, det er et spørgsmål om, hvilken type information, der er vigtig for Verden,
07:54
what sort of information
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hvilken type information,
07:56
can achieve reform.
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der kan forårsage reformer.
07:58
And there's a lot of information.
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Og der er masser af information.
08:00
So information that organizations
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Så information, som organisationer
08:02
are spending economic effort into concealing,
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bruger økonomisk anstrengelse på at skjule,
08:05
that's a really good signal
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det er et rigtigt godt signal på,
08:07
that when the information gets out,
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at når den information kommer frem,
08:09
there's a hope of it doing some good --
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er der håb for, at den vil forårsage noget godt.
08:11
because the organizations that know it best,
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Fordi, de organisationer, der kender den bedst,
08:13
that know it from the inside out,
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der kender den ud og ind,
08:15
are spending work to conceal it.
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bruger arbejde på at skjule den.
08:18
And that's what we've found in practice,
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Og det er, hvad vi oplever i praksis.
08:20
and that's what the history of journalism is.
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Og det er det, der er historien om journalistik.
08:23
CA: But are there risks with that,
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Men er der risici ved det,
08:26
either to the individuals concerned
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enten for de enkelte involverede
08:29
or indeed to society at large,
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eller endda for hele samfundet,
08:31
where leaking can actually have
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hvor lækage faktisk kan have
08:33
an unintended consequence?
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en utilsigtet konsekvens?
08:35
JA: Not that we have seen with anything we have released.
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Ikke så vidt vi har set med noget, vi har offentliggjort.
08:37
I mean, we have a harm immunization policy.
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Jeg mener, vi har en "skade-immun"-politik.
08:39
We have a way of dealing with information
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Vi har en måde at omgås informationer,
08:41
that has sort of personal --
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der har en slags personlig -
08:43
personally identifying information in it.
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personidentitetsinformation i sig.
08:46
But there are legitimate secrets --
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Men der er legitime hemmeligheder,
08:49
you know, your records with your doctor;
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du ved, din lægejournal,
08:52
that's a legitimate secret --
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det er en legitim hemmelighed.
08:54
but we deal with whistleblowers that are coming forward
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Men vi har at gøre med fløjteblæsere,
08:56
that are really sort of well-motivated.
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der egentlig har gode motiver.
08:59
CA: So they are well-motivated.
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Så de har gode motiver.
09:01
And what would you say to, for example,
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Og hvad ville du sige til, for eksempel,
09:03
the, you know, the parent of someone
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du ved, en forælder,
09:06
whose son is out serving the U.S. military,
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hvis søn er udstationeret med det amerikanske militær,
09:09
and he says, "You know what,
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og han siger: "Ved du hvad,
09:11
you've put up something that someone had an incentive to put out.
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du har offentliggjort noget, nogen havde bagtanker med at få offentliggjort.
09:13
It shows a U.S. soldier laughing
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Det viser en amerikansk soldat, der ler
09:15
at people dying.
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af døende mennesker.
09:17
That gives the impression, has given the impression,
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Det giver det indtryk - har givet det indtryk
09:19
to millions of people around the world
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til millioner af folk verden over,
09:21
that U.S. soldiers are inhuman people.
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at amerikanske soldater er umenneskelige.
09:23
Actually, they're not. My son isn't. How dare you?"
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Det er de faktisk ikke. Min søn er ikke. Hvor vover du?"
09:25
What would you say to that?
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Hvad ville du sige til det?
09:27
JA: Yeah, we do get a lot of that.
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Jeps, det får vi meget af.
09:29
But remember, the people in Baghdad,
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Men husk at folk i Bagdad,
09:31
the people in Iraq, the people in Afghanistan --
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folk i Irak, folk i Afghanistan,
09:34
they don't need to see the video;
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de behøver ikke at se videoen;
09:36
they see it every day.
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de ser det hver dag.
09:38
So it's not going to change their opinion. It's not going to change their perception.
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Så det ændrer ikke på deres mening. Det forandrer ikke deres opfattelse.
09:41
That's what they see every day.
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Det er, hvad de ser hver dag.
09:43
It will change the perception and opinion
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Det vil ændre opfattelsen og meningen
09:46
of the people who are paying for it all,
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hos de folk, der betaler for det hele.
09:48
and that's our hope.
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Og det er vores håb.
09:51
CA: So you found a way to shine light
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Så I fandt en måde at belyse,
09:54
into what you see
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hvad I ser
09:57
as these sort of dark secrets in companies and in government.
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som en slags mørke hemmeligheder i firmaer og regeringer.
10:01
Light is good.
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Lys er godt.
10:03
But do you see any irony in the fact that,
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Men ser du noget ironisk i det faktum,
10:05
in order for you to shine that light,
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at for at I kan belyse hemmelighederne,
10:07
you have to, yourself,
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så er I selv nødt til
10:09
create secrecy around your sources?
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at være hemmelige med hensyn til jeres kilder?
10:12
JA: Not really. I mean, we don't have
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Ikke rigtigt! Jeg mener, vi har
10:15
any WikiLeaks dissidents yet.
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ingen WikiLeaks dissenter endnu.
10:19
We don't have sources who are dissidents on other sources.
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Vi har ingen kilder, der er dissenter på andre kilder.
10:23
Should they come forward, that would be a tricky situation for us,
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Skulle det komme, vil det være en tricky situation for os.
10:26
but we're presumably acting in such a way
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Men formentlig agerer vi på en sådan måde,
10:29
that people feel
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at folk føler sig
10:31
morally compelled
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moralsk tvunget til
10:33
to continue our mission, not to screw it up.
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at fortsætte vores mission, ikke at ødelægge den.
10:37
CA: I'd actually be interested, just based on what we've heard so far --
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Jeg ville faktisk være interesseret, bare baseret på hvad vi har hørt indtil videre -
10:40
I'm curious as to the opinion in the TED audience.
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Jeg er nysgerrig efter at høre TED-publikummets mening.
10:45
You know, there might be a couple of views
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Du ved, måske er der et par meninger
10:47
of WikiLeaks and of Julian.
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om WikiLeaks og om Julian.
10:49
You know, hero -- people's hero --
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Du ved, helt - folkehelt -
10:52
bringing this important light.
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der belyser det vigtige.
10:55
Dangerous troublemaker.
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Farlig ballademager.
10:58
Who's got the hero view?
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Hvem mener helt?
11:02
Who's got the dangerous troublemaker view?
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Hvem mener farlig ballademager?
11:06
JA: Oh, come on. There must be some.
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Åh, come on! Der må være nogen.
11:09
CA: It's a soft crowd, Julian, a soft crowd.
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Det er en blød hob Julian, en blød hob.
11:11
We have to try better. Let's show them another example.
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Vi må gøre et bedre forsøg. Lad os vise dem et andet eksempel.
11:13
Now here's something that you haven't yet leaked,
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Se, her er noget, I endnu ikke har lækket,
11:16
but I think for TED you are.
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men jeg tror, du har til TED.
11:19
I mean it's an intriguing story that's just happened, right?
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Jeg mener, det er en fascinerende historie, der lige er sket, ikke?
11:21
What is this?
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Hvad er det?
11:23
JA: So this is a sample of what we do
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Ja, dette er et eksempel på, hvad vi gør
11:25
sort of every day.
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omtrent hver dag.
11:27
So late last year -- in November last year --
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Altså, sent sidste år - i november sidste år -
11:30
there was a series of well blowouts
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var der en række eksplosioner af oliebrønde
11:32
in Albania,
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i Albanien
11:34
like the well blowout in the Gulf of Mexico,
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ligesom eksplosionen af oliebrønden i den Mexikanske Golf
11:37
but not quite as big.
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men ikke helt ligeså store.
11:39
And we got a report --
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Og vi fik en rapport,
11:42
a sort of engineering analysis into what happened --
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en slags ingeniørredegørelse over hvad, der skete.
11:45
saying that, in fact, security guards
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Der stod faktisk, at sikkerhedsvagter
11:48
from some rival, various competing oil firms
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fra forskellige rivaliserende konkurrerende oliefirmaer
11:51
had, in fact, parked trucks there and blown them up.
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havde parkeret lastvogne der og sprængt dem i luften.
11:55
And part of the Albanian government was in this, etc., etc.
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Og dele af den albanske regering var med i det, osv., osv.
11:59
And the engineering report
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Og ingeniørrapporten
12:00
had nothing on the top of it,
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havde ingen forside.
12:02
so it was an extremely difficult document for us.
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Så det var et ekstremt svært dokument for os.
12:04
We couldn't verify it because we didn't know
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Vi kunne ikke verificere det, for vi vidste ikke
12:06
who wrote it and knew what it was about.
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hvem, der havde skrevet det og kendte til dets indhold.
12:08
So we were kind of skeptical that maybe it was
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Så vi var noget skeptiske. Måske var det
12:10
a competing oil firm just sort of playing the issue up.
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et konkurrerende oliefirma, der ville blæse sagen op.
12:12
So under that basis, we put it out and said,
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Så på den basis lagde vi det ud og sagde:
12:14
"Look, we're skeptical about this thing.
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"Hør her, vi er skeptiske omkring det her.
12:16
We don't know, but what can we do?
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Vi er ikke sikre, men hvad kan vi gøre?
12:18
The material looks good, it feels right,
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Materialet ser godt ud, det føles rigtigt,
12:20
but we just can't verify it."
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men vi kan bare ikke verificere det."
12:22
And we then got a letter
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Og så modtager vi et brev
12:25
just this week
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netop i denne uge
12:28
from the company who wrote it,
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fra firmaet, der skrev den
12:31
wanting to track down the source --
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og gerne vil opspore kilden...
12:34
(Laughter)
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(Latter)
12:38
saying, "Hey, we want to track down the source."
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og siger: "Hey, vi vil gerne opspore kilden."
12:41
And we were like, "Oh, tell us more.
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Og vi var sådan: "Åh, fortæl os mere.
12:43
What document is it, precisely, you're talking about?
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Præcis hvilket dokument er det, I snakker om?
12:46
Can you show that you had legal authority over that document?
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Kan I bevise, I har de legale rettigheder over det dokument?
12:49
Is it really yours?"
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Er det virkelig jeres?"
12:51
So they sent us this screen shot
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Så sendte de os et screen shot
12:54
with the author
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med forfatteren
12:56
in the Microsoft Word ID.
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og hans Microsoft Word ID.
13:01
Yeah.
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Jeps!
13:03
(Applause)
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(Bifald)
13:08
That's happened quite a lot though.
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Det er faktisk sket ret ofte.
13:10
This is like one of our methods
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Det er en af vore metoder
13:12
of identifying, of verifying, what a material is,
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til identifikation - til verificering af materiale,
13:15
is to try and get these guys to write letters.
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at prøve at få folk til at skrive breve.
13:17
CA: Yeah. Have you had information
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Jeps. Har I fået insiderinformation
13:20
from inside BP?
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fra BP?
13:22
JA: Yeah, we have a lot, but I mean, at the moment,
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Jeps, vi har masser, men jeg mener, i øjeblikket
13:25
we are undergoing a sort of serious fundraising and engineering effort.
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er vi igang med et seriøs fundraising og teknisk arbejde.
13:28
So our publication rate
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Så vores publikationsrate
13:30
over the past few months
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har i løbet af de sidste få måneder,
13:32
has been sort of minimized
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været lidt minimeret,
13:34
while we're re-engineering our back systems
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mens vi reorganiserer vores backingsystemer
13:37
for the phenomenal public interest that we have.
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til den fænomenale offentlige interesse, vi har modtaget.
13:40
That's a problem.
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Det er et problem.
13:42
I mean, like any sort of growing startup organization,
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Ligesom enhver form for voksende begynderorganisation
13:45
we are sort of overwhelmed
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er vi en form for overvældede
13:47
by our growth,
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af vores vækst.
13:49
and that means we're getting enormous quantity
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Og det betyder, at vi fra fløjteblæsere
13:51
of whistleblower disclosures
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får en enorm mængde afsløringer
13:53
of a very high caliber
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af en meget høj kaliber,
13:55
but don't have enough people to actually
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men ikke har nok folk til egentlig
13:57
process and vet this information.
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at bearbejde og undersøge denne information.
13:59
CA: So that's the key bottleneck,
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Så det er den væsentligste flaskehals,
14:01
basically journalistic volunteers
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dybest set - frivillige journalister
14:03
and/or the funding of journalistic salaries?
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og/eller finansieringen af journalistlønninger?
14:06
JA: Yep. Yeah, and trusted people.
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Jep! Jeps, og betroede folk.
14:08
I mean, we're an organization
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Jeg mener, vi er en organisation,
14:10
that is hard to grow very quickly
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det er svær at lade vokse meget hurtig,
14:12
because of the sort of material we deal with,
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pga. den slags materiale vi håndterer.
14:14
so we have to restructure
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Så vi må omstrukturere
14:17
in order to have people
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for at få folk,
14:19
who will deal with the highest national security stuff,
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der vil håndtere det højeste nationale sikkerhedsstof
14:22
and then lower security cases.
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og også lavere sikkerhedssager.
14:24
CA: So help us understand a bit about you personally
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Så hjælp os til at forstå dig personligt
14:27
and how you came to do this.
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og hvordan du begyndte at gøre det her.
14:29
And I think I read that as a kid
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Jeg tror, jeg læste, at som barn
14:31
you went to 37 different schools.
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gik du på 37 forskellige skoler.
14:34
Can that be right?
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Kan det være rigtigt?
14:36
JA: Well, my parents were in the movie business
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Altså, mine forældre var i filmbranchen
14:39
and then on the run from a cult,
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og på flugt fra en kult,
14:41
so the combination between the two ...
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så kombinationen af de to ting...
14:43
(Laughter)
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(Latter)
14:47
CA: I mean, a psychologist might say
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Jeg mener, en psykolog ville måske sige,
14:49
that's a recipe for breeding paranoia.
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det er en opskrift på avl af paranoia.
14:52
JA: What, the movie business?
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Hvad, filmbranchen?
14:54
(Laughter)
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(Latter)
14:57
(Applause)
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(Bifald)
15:00
CA: And you were also -- I mean,
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Og du var også - jeg mener,
15:02
you were also a hacker at an early age
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du var også hacker i en tidlig alder
15:04
and ran into the authorities early on.
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og rendte tidligt ind i autoriteterne.
15:07
JA: Well, I was a journalist.
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Altså, jeg var journalist.
15:10
You know, I was a very young journalist activist at an early age.
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Du ved, jeg var en meget ung journalist-aktivist i en tidlig alder.
15:12
I wrote a magazine,
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Jeg skrev et blad,
15:14
was prosecuted for it when I was a teenager.
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blev retsforfulgt for det, da jeg var teenager.
15:17
So you have to be careful with hacker.
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Så man skal være forsigtig med at hacke.
15:19
I mean there's like -- there's a method
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Jeg mener, der er sådan - der er en metode,
15:21
that can be deployed for various things.
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der kan anvendes til forskellige ting.
15:23
Unfortunately, at the moment,
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Desværre bliver den i øjeblikket
15:25
it's mostly deployed by the Russian mafia
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mest anvendt af den russiske mafia
15:27
in order to steal your grandmother's bank accounts.
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til at stjæle din bedstmors bankkonti.
15:29
So this phrase is not,
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Så den sætning er ikke -
15:32
not as nice as it used to be.
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ikke så rar, som den har været.
15:34
CA: Yeah, well, I certainly don't think
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Jeps, altså, jeg tror bestemt ikke,
15:36
you're stealing anyone's grandmother's bank account,
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du stjæler nogens bedstemors bankkonto.
15:39
but what about
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Men hvad med
15:41
your core values?
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dine kerneværdier?
15:43
Can you give us a sense of what they are
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Kan du give os en fornemmelse af, hvad de er
15:46
and maybe some incident in your life
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og måske en episode i dit liv,
15:48
that helped determine them?
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der hjalp til at definere dem?
15:53
JA: I'm not sure about the incident.
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Jeg er ikke sikker omkring episoden.
15:55
But the core values:
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Men kerneværdierne:
15:58
well, capable, generous men
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Altså, kompetente generøse mænd
16:01
do not create victims;
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skaber ikke ofre;
16:03
they nurture victims.
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de hjælper ofre.
16:05
And that's something from my father
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Og det er noget fra min far
16:07
and something from other capable, generous men
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og noget fra andre kompetente generøse mænd,
16:10
that have been in my life.
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der har været i mit liv.
16:13
CA: Capable, generous men do not create victims;
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Kompetente generøse mænd skaber ikke ofre;
16:15
they nurture victims?
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de hjælper ofre?
16:17
JA: Yeah. And you know,
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Jeps, og ved du hvad,
16:19
I'm a combative person,
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jeg er en kamplysten person,
16:23
so I'm not actually so big on the nurture,
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så jeg er faktisk ikke den store hjælper.
16:25
but some way --
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Men på en måde -
16:28
there is another way of nurturing victims,
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Der er en anden måde at hjælpe ofre på,
16:31
which is to police perpetrators
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det er at holde øje med kriminelle
16:34
of crime.
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gerningsmænd.
16:36
And so that is something
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Så det er noget,
16:38
that has been in my character
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der har været i min personlighed
16:40
for a long time.
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i lang tid.
16:42
CA: So just tell us, very quickly in the last minute, the story:
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Så fortæl os lige, her hurtigt til sidst, denne historie:
16:45
what happened in Iceland?
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Hvad skete der i Island?
16:48
You basically published something there,
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I hovedtræk offentliggjorde du noget der,
16:51
ran into trouble with a bank,
400
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løb ind i problemer med en bank
16:54
then the news service there
401
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og så overtog nyhedstjenesten der
16:56
was injuncted from running the story.
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og ændrede i sin historie.
16:59
Instead, they publicized your side.
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I stedet for, publicerede de din side.
17:01
That made you very high-profile in Iceland. What happened next?
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Det gjorde dig meget højprofileret i Island. Hvad skete der så?
17:04
JA: Yeah, this is a great case, you know.
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Jeps du ved, det er en fantastisk sag.
17:06
Iceland went through this financial crisis.
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Island gennemgik en finansiel krise.
17:08
It was the hardest hit of any country in the world.
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Den tog virkelig kegler der i forhold til resten af verden.
17:10
Its banking sector was 10 times the GDP
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Deres banksektor var 10 gange større end BNI'et
17:12
of the rest of the economy.
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for resten af økonomien.
17:14
Anyway, so we release this report
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Men altså, vi offentliggjorde denne rapport
17:17
in July last year.
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i juli sidste år.
17:20
And the national TV station was injuncted
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Og den nationale TV-station ændrede i sin historie
17:22
five minutes before it went on air,
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fem minutter før, de gik i luften.
17:24
like out of a movie: injunction landed on the news desk,
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Ligesom i en film, ændringen landede på nyhedsskrivebordet
17:26
and the news reader was like,
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og nyhedsoplæreren var sådan:
17:28
"This has never happened before. What do we do?"
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"Det her er aldrig sket før. Hvad skal vi gøre?"
17:30
Well, we just show the website instead,
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Altså, vi viser bare websitet i stedet,
17:32
for all that time, as a filler,
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hele tiden, som fyld.
17:35
and we became very famous in Iceland,
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Og vi blev meget berømte i Island,
17:37
went to Iceland and spoke about this issue.
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rejste til Island og talte om dette emne.
17:40
And there was a feeling in the community
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Og i samfundet var der en følelse af,
17:42
that that should never happen again,
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at det skulle aldrig ske igen.
17:44
and as a result,
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Og som resultat af
17:46
working with Icelandic politicians
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at arbejde med nogle islandske politikere
17:48
and some other international legal experts,
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og nogle andre internationale juridiske eksperter
17:50
we put together a new sort of
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sammensatte vi en ny slags
17:52
package of legislation for Iceland
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lovpakke for Island
17:55
to sort of become an offshore haven
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for at blive en slags tilflugtskyst
17:58
for the free press,
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for den frie presse,
18:01
with the strongest journalistic protections in the world,
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med den stærkeste journalistiske beskyttelse i verden,
18:04
with a new Nobel Prize
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med en ny Nobel-pris
18:06
for freedom of speech.
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for ytringsfrihed.
18:08
Iceland's a Nordic country,
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Island er et nordisk land
18:10
so, like Norway, it's able to tap into the system.
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så, ligesom Norge, er det i stand til at udnytte systemet.
18:13
And just a month ago,
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Og for blot en måned siden
18:15
this was passed by the Icelandic parliament unanimously.
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blev den enstemmig vedtaget af det islandske parlament.
18:18
CA: Wow.
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Wauv!
18:20
(Applause)
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(Bifald)
18:26
Last question, Julian.
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Sidste spørgsmål Julian.
18:28
When you think of the future then,
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Når du så tænker på fremtiden,
18:30
do you think it's more likely to be
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tror du, det er mere sandsynligt, at det bliver
18:32
Big Brother exerting more control,
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Big Brother, der udøver kontrol,
18:34
more secrecy,
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mere hemmelighedskræmmeri
18:36
or us watching
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eller os der våger
18:38
Big Brother,
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over Big Brother?
18:40
or it's just all to be played for either way?
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eller kommer det hele til at svinge fra side til side?
18:43
JA: I'm not sure which way it's going to go.
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Jeg er ikke sikker på, til hvilken side det kommer til at hælde.
18:45
I mean, there's enormous pressures
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Jeg mener, der er et enormt pres
18:47
to harmonize freedom of speech legislation
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for at harmonisere love om ytringsfrihed
18:50
and transparency legislation around the world --
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og gennemsigtig lovgivning rundt om i verden
18:53
within the E.U.,
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og indenfor EU,
18:55
between China and the United States.
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mellem Kina og USA.
18:57
Which way is it going to go? It's hard to see.
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Hvilken vej vil det gå? Det er svært at se.
19:00
That's why it's a very interesting time to be in --
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Det er derfor, vores tid er meget interessant.
19:02
because with just a little bit of effort,
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Fordi med blot en lille indsats
19:04
we can shift it one way or the other.
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kan vi dreje det i den ene eller anden retning.
19:07
CA: Well, it looks like I'm reflecting the audience's opinion
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Altså, det lader til, jeg reflekterer publikums mening,
19:10
to say, Julian, be careful,
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når jeg siger: Julian, vær forsigtig
19:12
and all power to you.
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og al magt til dig.
19:14
JA: Thank you, Chris. (CA: Thank you.)
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Tak Chris. Selv tak.
19:16
(Applause)
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(Bifald)
ABOUT THE SPEAKER
Julian Assange - WhistleblowerInternet activist Julian Assange serves as spokesperson for WikiLeaks, a controversial, volunteer-driven website that publishes and comments on leaked documents alleging government and corporate misconduct.
Why you should listen
You could say Australian-born Julian Assange has swapped his long-time interest in network security flaws for the far-more-suspect flaws of even bigger targets: governments and corporations. Since his early 20s, he has been using network technology to prod and probe the vulnerable edges of administrative systems, but though he was a computing hobbyist first (in 1991 he was the target of hacking charges after he accessed the computers of an Australian telecom), he's now taken off his "white hat" and launched a career as one of the world's most visible human-rights activists.
He calls himself "editor in chief." He travels the globe as its spokesperson. Yet Assange's part in WikiLeaks is clearly dicier than that: he's become the face of creature that, simply, many powerful organizations would rather see the world rid of. His Wikipedia entry says he is "constantly on the move," and some speculate that his role in publishing decrypted US military video has put him in personal danger. A controversial figure, pundits debate whether his work is reckless and does more harm than good. Amnesty International recognized him with an International Media Award in 2009.
Assange studied physics and mathematics at the University of Melbourne. He wrote Strobe, the first free and open-source port scanner, and contributed to the book Underground: Tales of Hacking, Madness and Obsession on the Electronic Frontier.
Julian Assange | Speaker | TED.com