TEDGlobal 2011
Maajid Nawaz: A global culture to fight extremism
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Why do transnational extremist organizations succeed where democratic movements have a harder time taking hold? Maajid Nawaz, a former Islamist extremist, asks for new grassroots stories and global social activism to spread democracy in the face of nationalism and xenophobia.
Maajid Nawaz - Anti-extremism activist
Maajid Nawaz works to promote conversation, tolerance and democracy in Muslim and non-Muslim communities. Full bio
Maajid Nawaz works to promote conversation, tolerance and democracy in Muslim and non-Muslim communities. Full bio
Double-click the English transcript below to play the video.
00:15
Have you ever wondered
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why extremism seems to have been on the rise in Muslim-majority countries
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over the course of the last decade?
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Have you ever wondered
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how such a situation can be turned around?
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Have you ever looked at the Arab uprisings
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and thought, "How could we have predicted that?"
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or "How could we have better prepared for that?"
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Well my personal story, my personal journey,
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what brings me to the TED stage here today,
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is a demonstration of exactly what's been happening
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in Muslim-majority countries
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over the course of the last decades, at least, and beyond.
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I want to share some of that story with you,
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but also some of my ideas around change
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and the role of social movements in creating change
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in Muslim-majority societies.
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So let me begin
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by first of all giving a very, very brief history of time,
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if I may indulge.
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In medieval societies there were defined allegiances.
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An identity was defined
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primarily by religion.
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And then we moved on into an era in the 19th century
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with the rise of a European nation-state
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where identities and allegiances were defined
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by ethnicity.
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So identity was primarily defined by ethnicity,
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and the nation-state reflected that.
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In the age of globalization, we moved on.
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I call it the era of citizenship --
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where people could be from multi-racial, multi-ethnic backgrounds,
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but all be equal as citizens
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in a state.
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You could be American-Italian; you could be American-Irish;
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you could be British-Pakistani.
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But I believe now
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that we're moving into a new age,
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and that age The New York Times dubbed recently
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as "the age of behavior."
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How I define the age of behavior
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is a period of transnational allegiances,
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where identity is defined more so
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by ideas and narratives.
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And these ideas and narratives that bump people across borders
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are increasingly beginning to affect
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the way in which people behave.
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Now this is not all necessarily good news,
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because it's also my belief
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that hatred has gone global
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just as much as love.
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But actually it's my belief
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that the people who've been truly capitalizing on this age of behavior,
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up until now, up until recent times,
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up until the last six months,
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the people who have been capitalizing most
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on the age of behavior
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and the transnational allegiances,
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using digital activism
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and other sorts of borderless technologies,
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those who've been benefiting from this
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have been extremists.
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And that's something which I'd like to elaborate on.
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If we look at Islamists,
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if we look at the phenomenon
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of far-right fascists,
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one thing they've been very good at,
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one thing that they've actually been exceeding in,
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is communicating across borders,
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using technologies to organize themselves,
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to propagate their message
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and to create truly global phenomena.
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Now I should know,
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because for 13 years of my life,
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I was involved in an extreme Islamist organization.
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And I was actually a potent force
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in spreading ideas across borders,
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and I witnessed the rise of Islamist extremism
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as distinct from Islam the faith,
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and the way in which it influenced my co-religionists
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across the world.
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And my story, my personal story,
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is truly evidence for the age of behavior
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that I'm attempting to elaborate upon here.
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I was, by the way -- I'm an Essex lad,
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born and raised in Essex in the U.K.
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Anyone who's from England
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knows the reputation we have from Essex.
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But having been born in Essex,
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at the age of 16,
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I joined an organization.
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At the age of 17, I was recruiting people from Cambridge University
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to this organization.
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At the age of 19,
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I was on the national leadership of this organization in the U.K.
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At the age of 21, I was co-founding this organization in Pakistan.
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At the age of 22,
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I was co-founding this organization in Denmark.
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By the age of 24,
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I found myself convicted in prison in Egypt,
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being blacklisted from three countries in the world
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for attempting to overthrow their governments,
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being subjected to torture
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in Egyptian jails
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and sentenced to five years as a prisoner of conscience.
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Now that journey,
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and what took me from Essex all the way across the world --
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by the way, we were laughing at democratic activists.
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We felt they were from the age of yesteryear.
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We felt that they were out of date.
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I learned how to use email
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from the extremist organization that I used.
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I learned how to effectively communicate across borders
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without being detected.
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Eventually I was detected, of course, in Egypt.
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But the way in which I learned
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to use technology to my advantage
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was because I was within an extremist organization
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that was forced to think beyond
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the confines of the nation-state.
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The age of behavior: where ideas and narratives
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were increasingly defining behavior
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and identity and allegiances.
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So as I said, we looked to the status quo
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and ridiculed it.
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And it's not just Islamist extremists that did this.
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But even if you look across
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the mood music in Europe of late,
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far-right fascism is also on the rise.
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A form of anti-Islam rhetoric
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is also on the rise
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and it's transnational.
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And the consequences that this is having
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is that it's affecting the political climate
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across Europe.
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What's actually happening
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is that what were previously localized parochialisms,
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individual or groupings of extremists
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who were isolated from one another,
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have become interconnected in a globalized way
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and have thus become, or are becoming, mainstream.
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Because the Internet and connection technologies
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are connecting them across the world.
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If you look at the rise of far-right fascism across Europe of late,
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you will see some things that are happening
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that are influencing domestic politics,
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yet the phenomenon is transnational.
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In certain countries, mosque minarets are being banned.
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In others, headscarves are being banned.
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In others, kosher and halal meat are being banned,
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as we speak.
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And on the flip side,
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we have transnational Islamist extremists
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doing the same thing across their own societies.
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And so they are pockets of parochialism that are being connected
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in a way that makes them feel like they are mainstream.
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Now that never would have been possible before.
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They would have felt isolated,
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until these sorts of technologies came around
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and connected them in a way
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that made them feel part of a larger phenomenon.
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06:40
Where does that leave democracy aspirants?
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06:43
Well I believe they're getting left far behind.
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And I'll give you an example here at this stage.
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If any of you remembers the Christmas Day bomb plot:
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there's a man called Anwar al-Awlaki.
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As an American citizen, ethnically a Yemeni,
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in hiding currently in Yemen,
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who inspired a Nigerian,
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son of the head of Nigeria's national bank.
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This Nigerian student studied in London, trained in Yemen,
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boarded a flight in Amsterdam to attack America.
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In the meanwhile,
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the Old mentality with a capital O,
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was represented by his father, the head of the Nigerian bank,
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warning the CIA that his own son was about to attack,
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and this warning fell on deaf ears.
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The Old mentality with a capital O,
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as represented by the nation-state,
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not yet fully into the age of behavior,
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not recognizing the power of transnational social movements,
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got left behind.
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And the Christmas Day bomber almost succeeded
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in attacking the United States of America.
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Again with the example of the far right:
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that we find, ironically,
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xenophobic nationalists
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are utilizing the benefits of globalization.
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So why are they succeeding?
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And why are democracy aspirants falling behind?
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Well we need to understand the power of the social movements who understand this.
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And a social movement is comprised, in my view,
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it's comprised of four main characteristics.
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It's comprised of ideas and narratives
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and symbols and leaders.
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I'll talk you through one example,
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and that's the example that everyone here will be aware of,
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and that's the example of Al-Qaeda.
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If I asked you to think of the ideas of Al-Qaeda,
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that's something that comes to your mind immediately.
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If I ask you to think of their narratives --
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the West being at war with Islam, the need to defend Islam against the West --
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these narratives, they come to your mind immediately.
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Incidentally, the difference between ideas and narratives:
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the idea is the cause that one believes in;
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and the narrative is the way to sell that cause --
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the propaganda, if you like, of the cause.
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So the ideas and the narratives of Al-Qaeda come to your mind immediately.
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If I ask you to think of their symbols and their leaders,
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they come to your mind immediately.
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One of their leaders was killed in Pakistan recently.
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So these symbols and these leaders
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come to your mind immediately.
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And that's the power of social movements.
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They're transnational, and they bond around these ideas and narratives
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and these symbols and these leaders.
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09:02
However,
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if I ask your minds to focus currently on Pakistan,
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and I ask you to think
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of the symbols and the leaders for democracy
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in Pakistan today,
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you'll be hard pressed
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to think beyond perhaps
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the assassination of Benazir Bhutto.
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Which means, by definition,
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that particular leader no longer exists.
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One of the problems we're facing is, in my view,
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that there are no globalized,
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youth-led, grassroots social movements
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advocating for democratic culture
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across Muslim-majority societies.
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There is no equivalent of the Al-Qaeda, without the terrorism,
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for democracy across Muslim-majority societies.
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There are no ideas and narratives and leaders and symbols
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advocating the democratic culture on the ground.
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So that begs the next question.
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Why is it that extremist organizations,
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whether of the far-right or of the Islamist extremism --
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Islamism meaning those who wish to impose
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one version of Islam over the rest of society --
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why is it that they are succeeding
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in organizing in a globalized way,
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whereas those who aspire to democratic culture
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are falling behind?
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And I believe that's for four reasons.
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I believe, number one, it's complacency.
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Because those who aspire to democratic culture
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are in power,
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or have societies
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that are leading globalized, powerful societies,
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powerful countries.
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And that level of complacency means
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they don't feel the need to advocate for that culture.
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The second, I believe,
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is political correctness.
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That we have a hesitation
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in espousing the universality of democratic culture
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because we are associating that --
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we associate believing in the universality of our values --
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with extremists.
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Yet actually, whenever we talk about human rights,
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we do say that human rights are universal.
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But actually going out to propagate that view
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is associated with either neoconservativism
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or with Islamist extremism.
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To go around saying that I believe
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democratic culture is the best that we've arrived at
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as a form of political organizing
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is associated with extremism.
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And the third,
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democratic choice in Muslim-majority societies
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has been relegated to a political choice,
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meaning political parties
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in many of these societies
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ask people to vote for them
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as the democratic party,
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but then the other parties ask them to vote for them
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as the military party --
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wanting to rule by military dictatorship.
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And then you have a third party saying,
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"Vote for us; we'll establish a theocracy."
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So democracy has become merely one political choice
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among many other forms
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of political choices available in those societies.
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And what happens as a result of this
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is, when those parties are elected,
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and inevitably they fail,
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or inevitably they make political mistakes,
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democracy takes the blame
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for their political mistakes.
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And then people say, "We've tried democracy. It doesn't really work.
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Let's bring the military back again."
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And the fourth reason, I believe,
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is what I've labeled here on the slide as the ideology of resistance.
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What I mean by that is,
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if the world superpower today was a communist,
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it would be much easier for democracy activists
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to use democracy activism
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as a form of resistance against colonialism,
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than it is today with the world superpower being America,
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occupying certain lands
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and also espousing democratic ideals.
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So roughly these four reasons
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make it a lot more difficult for democratic culture to spread
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as a civilizational choice,
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not merely as a political choice.
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When talking about those reasons,
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let's break down certain preconceptions.
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Is it just about grievances?
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Is it just about a lack of education?
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Well statistically,
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the majority of those who join extremist organizations are highly educated.
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Statistically, they are educated, on average,
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above the education levels
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of Western society.
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Anecdotally, we can demonstrate
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that if poverty was the only factor,
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well Bin Laden is from one of the richest families in Saudi Arabia.
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His deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was a pediatrician --
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not an ill-educated man.
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International aid and development has been going on for years,
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but extremism in those societies, in many of those societies,
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has been on the rise.
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And what I believe is missing
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is genuine grassroots activism
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on the ground,
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in addition to international aid,
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in addition to education, in addition to health.
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Not exclusive to these things, but in addition to them,
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is propagating a genuine demand for democracy on the ground.
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And this is where I believe
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neoconservatism had it upside-down.
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Neoconservatism had the philosophy
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that you go in with a supply-led approach
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to impose democratic values from the top down.
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Whereas Islamists and far-right organizations, for decades,
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have been building demand for their ideology on the grassroots.
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They've been building civilizational demand for their values
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on the grassroots,
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and we've been seeing those societies slowly transition
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to societies that are increasingly asking for
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a form of Islamism.
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Mass movements in Pakistan
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have been represented after the Arab uprisings
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mainly by organizations
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claiming for some form of theocracy,
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rather than for a democratic uprising.
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Because since pre-partition,
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they've been building demand for their ideology on the ground.
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And what's needed is a genuine transnational
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youth-led movement
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that works to actively advocate
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for the democratic culture --
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which is necessarily more
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than just elections.
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But without freedom of speech, you can't have free and fair elections.
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Without human rights, you don't have the protection granted to you to campaign.
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Without freedom of belief,
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you don't have the right to join organizations.
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So what's needed is those organizations on the ground
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advocating for the democratic culture itself
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to create the demand on the ground for this culture.
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What that will do
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is avoid the problem I was talking about earlier,
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where currently we have political parties presenting democracy
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as merely a political choice in those societies
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alongside other choices
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such as military rule and theocracy.
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Whereas if we start building this demand on the ground on a civilizational level,
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rather than merely on a political level,
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a level above politics --
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movements that are not political parties,
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but are rather creating this civilizational demand
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for this democratic culture.
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What we'll have in the end
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is this ideal that you see on the slide here --
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the ideal that people should vote in an existing democracy,
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not for a democracy.
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But to get to that stage,
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where democracy builds the fabric of society
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and the political choices within that fabric,
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but are certainly not theocratic and military dictatorship --
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i.e. you're voting in a democracy,
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in an existing democracy,
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and that democracy is not merely one of the choices at the ballot box.
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To get to that stage,
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we genuinely need to start building demand
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in those societies on the ground.
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Now to conclude, how does that happen?
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Well, Egypt is a good starting point.
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The Arab uprisings have demonstrated that this is already beginning.
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But what happened in the Arab uprisings and what happened in Egypt
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was particularly cathartic for me.
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What happened there was a political coalition
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gathered together for a political goal,
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and that was to remove the leader.
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We need to move one step beyond that now.
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We need to see how we can help those societies
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move from political coalitions,
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loosely based political coalitions,
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to civilizational coalitions
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that are working for the ideals and narratives
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of the democratic culture on the ground.
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Because it's not enough to remove a leader
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or ruler or dictator.
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That doesn't guarantee that what comes next
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will be a society built on democratic values.
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But generally, the trends that start in Egypt
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have historically spread across the MENA region,
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the Middle East and North Africa region.
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So when Arab socialism started in Egypt, it spread across the region.
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In the '80s and '90s when Islamism started in the region,
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it spread across the MENA region as a whole.
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And the aspiration that we have at the moment --
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as young Arabs are proving today
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and instantly rebranding themselves
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as being prepared to die for more than just terrorism --
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is that there is a chance
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that democratic culture can start in the region
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and spread across to the rest of the countries that are surrounding that.
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But that will require
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helping these societies transition
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from having merely political coalitions
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to building genuinely grassroots-based social movements
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that advocate for the democratic culture.
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And we've made a start for that in Pakistan
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with a movement called Khudi,
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where we are working on the ground to encourage the youth
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to create genuine buy-in for the democratic culture.
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And it's with that thought that I'll end.
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And my time is up, and thank you for your time.
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(Applause)
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ABOUT THE SPEAKER
Maajid Nawaz - Anti-extremism activistMaajid Nawaz works to promote conversation, tolerance and democracy in Muslim and non-Muslim communities.
Why you should listen
As a teenager, British-born Maajid Nawaz was recruited to the global Islamist party Hizb ut-Tahrir, whose goal, broadly put, is to unite all Muslim countries into one caliphate ruled by Islamic law. He spent more than a decade there, rising into its leadership, until he was sentenced to four years in an Egyptian prison for belonging to the group. But he left prison feeling that Hizb ut-Tahrir was hijacking Islam for political purposes and that its aims were dangerously similar to the aims of fascism. While remaining a Muslim, he was no longer an Islamist.
His goal now is to help Muslims in the West engage in their current political frameworks, while encouraging non-Western Muslims to work for a democratic culture that values peace and women’s rights. In the UK, he co-founded Quilliam, a think-tank that engages in “counter-Islamist thought-generating” -- looking for new narratives of citizenship, identity and belonging in a globalized world.
He says: "I can now say that the more I learnt about Islam, the more tolerant I became."
Maajid Nawaz | Speaker | TED.com