ABOUT THE SPEAKER
Richard Ledgett - Deputy director, NSA
Richard Ledgett is deputy director and senior civilian leader of the National Security Agency. He acts as the agency’s chief operating officer, responsible for guiding and directing studies, operations and policy.

Why you should listen

Richard Ledgett began his NSA career in 1988 and has served in operational, management, and technical leadership positions at the branch, division, office, and group levels. Now, think of him as the COO of the NSA, guiding and directing studies, operations and policy. From 2012 to 2013 he was the Director of the NSA/CSS Threat Operations Center, responsible for round-the-clock cryptologic activities to discover and counter adversary cyber efforts. Prior to NTOC he served in several positions from 2010 to 2012 in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in both the collection and cyber mission areas. He was the first National Intelligence Manager for Cyber, serving as principal advisor to the Director of National Intelligence on all cyber matters, leading development of the Unified Intelligence Strategy for Cyber, and coordinating cyber activities across the Intelligence Community (IC). Previous positions at NSA include Deputy Director for Analysis and Production (2009-2010), Deputy Director for Data Acquisition (2006-2009), Assistant Deputy Director for Data Acquisition (2005-2006), and Chief, NSA/CSS Pacific (2002-2005). He also served in a joint IC operational activity, and as an instructor and course developer at the National Cryptologic School.

He led the NSA Media Leaks Task Force from June 2013 to January 2014, and was responsible for integrating and overseeing the totality of NSA’s efforts surrounding the unauthorized disclosures of classified information by a former NSA affiliate.

More profile about the speaker
Richard Ledgett | Speaker | TED.com
TED2014

Richard Ledgett: The NSA responds to Edward Snowden's TED Talk

Filmed:
1,250,044 views

After a surprise appearance by Edward Snowden at TED2014, Chris Anderson said: "If the NSA wants to respond, please do." And yes, they did. Appearing by video, NSA deputy director Richard Ledgett answers Anderson's questions about the balance between security and protecting privacy.
- Deputy director, NSA
Richard Ledgett is deputy director and senior civilian leader of the National Security Agency. He acts as the agency’s chief operating officer, responsible for guiding and directing studies, operations and policy. Full bio

Double-click the English transcript below to play the video.

00:12
Chris Anderson: We had Edward Snowden here
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a couple days ago,
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and this is response time.
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And several of you have written to me
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with questions to ask our guest here from the NSA.
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So Richard Ledgett is the 15th deputy director
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of the National Security Agency,
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and he's a senior civilian officer there,
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acts as its chief operating officer,
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guiding strategies, setting internal policies,
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and serving as the principal advisor to the director.
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And all being well,
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welcome, Rick Ledgett, to TED.
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(Applause)
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Richard Ledgett: I'm really thankful for the opportunity to talk to folks here.
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I look forward to the conversation,
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so thanks for arranging for that.
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CA: Thank you, Rick.
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We appreciate you joining us.
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It's certainly quite a strong statement
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that the NSA is willing to reach out
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and show a more open face here.
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You saw, I think,
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the talk and interview that Edward Snowden
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gave here a couple days ago.
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What did you make of it?
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RL: So I think it was interesting.
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We didn't realize that he
was going to show up there,
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so kudos to you guys for arranging
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a nice surprise like that.
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I think that, like a lot of the things
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that have come out since Mr. Snowden
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started disclosing classified information,
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there were some kernels of truth in there,
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but a lot of extrapolations and half-truths in there,
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and I'm interested in helping to address those.
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I think this is a really important conversation
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that we're having in the United States
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and internationally,
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and I think it is important and of import,
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and so given that, we need to have that be
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a fact-based conversation,
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and we want to help make that happen.
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CA: So the question that a lot
of people have here is,
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what do you make of Snowden's motivations
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for doing what he did,
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and did he have an alternative
way that he could have gone?
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RL: He absolutely did
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have alternative ways that he could have gone,
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and I actually think that characterizing him
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as a whistleblower
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actually hurts legitimate whistleblowing activities.
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So what if somebody who works in the NSA --
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and there are over 35,000 people who do.
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They're all great citizens.
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They're just like your husbands, fathers, sisters,
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brothers, neighbors, nephews, friends and relatives,
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all of whom are interested in doing the right thing
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for their country
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and for our allies internationally,
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and so there are a variety of venues to address
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if folks have a concern.
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First off, there's their supervisor,
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and up through the supervisory chain
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within their organization.
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If folks aren't comfortable with that,
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there are a number of inspectors general.
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In the case of Mr. Snowden, he had the option
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of the NSA inspector general,
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the Navy inspector general,
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the Pacific Command inspector general,
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the Department of Defense inspector general,
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and the intelligence community inspector general,
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any of whom would have both kept
his concerns in classified channels
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and been happy to address them.
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(CA and RL speaking at once)
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He had the option to go to
congressional committees,
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and there are mechanisms
to do that that are in place,
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and so he didn't do any of those things.
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CA: Now, you had said that
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Ed Snowden had other avenues
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for raising his concerns.
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The comeback on that is a couple of things:
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one, that he certainly believes that as a contractor,
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the avenues that would have been available
to him as an employee weren't available,
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two, there's a track record of other whistleblowers,
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like [Thomas Andrews Drake] being treated
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pretty harshly, by some views,
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and thirdly, what he was taking on
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was not one specific flaw that he'd discovered,
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but programs that had been approved
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by all three branches of government.
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I mean, in that circumstance,
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couldn't you argue that what he did
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was reasonable?
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RL: No, I don't agree with that.
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I think that the —
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sorry, I'm getting feedback
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through the microphone there —
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the actions that he took were inappropriate
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because of the fact that
he put people's lives at risk,
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basically, in the long run,
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and I know there's been a lot of talk
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in public by Mr. Snowden
and some of the journalists
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that say that the things that have been disclosed
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have not put national security and people at risk,
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and that is categorically not true.
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They actually do.
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I think there's also an amazing arrogance
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to the idea that he knows better than
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the framers of the Constitution
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in how the government should
be designed and work
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for separation of powers
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and the fact that the executive
and the legislative branch
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have to work together and they have
checks and balances on each other,
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and then the judicial branch,
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which oversees the entire process.
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I think that's extremely arrogant on his part.
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CA: Can you give a specific example
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of how he put people's lives at risk?
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RL: Yeah, sure.
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So the things that he's disclosed,
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the capabilities,
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and the NSA is a capabilities-based organization,
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so when we have foreign intelligence targets,
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legitimate things of interest --
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like, terrorists is the iconic example,
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but it includes things like human traffickers,
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drug traffickers,
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people who are trying to build
advanced weaponry, nuclear weapons,
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and build delivery systems for those,
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and nation-states who might be executing aggression against their immediate neighbors,
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which you may have some visibility
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into some of that that's going on right now,
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the capabilities are applied
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in very discrete and measured and controlled ways.
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So the unconstrained disclosure
of those capabilities
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means that as adversaries see them
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and recognize, "Hey, I might be vulnerable to this,"
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they move away from that,
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and we have seen targets in terrorism,
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in the nation-state area,
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in smugglers of various types, and other folks
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who have, because of the disclosures,
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moved away from our ability
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to have insight into what they're doing.
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The net effect of that is that our people
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who are overseas in dangerous places,
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whether they're diplomats or military,
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and our allies who are in similar situations,
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are at greater risk because we don't see
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the threats that are coming their way.
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CA: So that's a general response saying that
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because of his revelations,
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access that you had to certain types of information
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has been shut down, has been closed down.
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But the concern is that the nature of that access
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was not necessarily legitimate in the first place.
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I mean, describe to us this Bullrun program
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where it's alleged that the NSA
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specifically weakened security
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in order to get the type of
access that you've spoken of.
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RL: So there are, when our
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legitimate foreign intelligence targets
of the type that I described before,
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use the global telecommunications system
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as their communications methodology,
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and they do, because it's a great system,
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it's the most complex system ever devised by man,
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and it is a wonder,
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and lots of folks in the room there
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are responsible for the creation
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and enhancement of that,
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and it's just a wonderful thing.
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But it's also used by people who are
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working against us and our allies.
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And so if I'm going to pursue them,
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I need to have the capability
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to go after them,
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and again, the controls are in
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how I apply that capability,
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not that I have the capability itself.
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Otherwise, if we could make it so that
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all the bad guys used one corner of the Internet,
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we could have a domain, badguy.com.
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That would be awesome,
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and we could just concentrate all our efforts there.
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That's not how it works.
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They're trying to hide
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from the government's ability
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to isolate and interdict their actions,
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and so we have to swim in that same space.
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But I will tell you this.
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So NSA has two missions.
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One is the Signals Intelligence mission
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that we've unfortunately read so
much about in the press.
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The other one is the Information Assurance mission,
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which is to protect the national security
systems of the United States,
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and by that, that's things like
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the communications that the president uses,
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the communications that
control our nuclear weapons,
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the communications that our
military uses around the world,
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and the communications that we use with our allies,
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and that some of our allies themselves use.
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And so we make recommendations
on standards to use,
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and we use those same standards,
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and so we are invested
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in making sure that those communications
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are secure for their intended purposes.
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CA: But it sounds like what you're saying is that
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when it comes to the Internet at large,
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any strategy is fair game
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if it improves America's safety.
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And I think this is partly where there is such
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a divide of opinion,
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that there's a lot of people in this room
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and around the world
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who think very differently about the Internet.
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They think of it as a momentous
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invention of humanity,
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kind of on a par with the
Gutenberg press, for example.
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It's the bringer of knowledge to all.
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It's the connector of all.
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And it's viewed in those sort of idealistic terms.
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And from that lens,
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what the NSA has done is equivalent to
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the authorities back in Germany
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inserting some device into every printing press
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that would reveal which books people bought
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and what they read.
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Can you understand that from that viewpoint,
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it feels outrageous?
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RL: I do understand that, and I actually share
the view of the utility of the Internet,
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and I would argue it's bigger than the Internet.
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It is a global telecommunications system.
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The Internet is a big chunk of
that, but there is a lot more.
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And I think that people have legitimate concerns
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about the balance between
transparency and secrecy.
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That's sort of been couched as a balance
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between privacy and national security.
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I don't think that's the right framing.
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I think it really is transparency and secrecy.
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And so that's the national and international conversation that we're having,
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and we want to participate in that, and want
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people to participate in it in an informed way.
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So there are things,
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let me talk there a little bit more,
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there are things that we need
to be transparent about:
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our authorities, our processes,
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our oversight, who we are.
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We, NSA, have not done a good job of that,
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and I think that's part of the reason
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that this has been so revelational
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and so sensational in the media.
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Nobody knew who we were. We were the No Such Agency, the Never Say Anything.
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There's takeoffs of our logo
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of an eagle with headphones on around it.
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And so that's the public characterization.
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And so we need to be more
transparent about those things.
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What we don't need to be transparent about,
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because it's bad for the U.S.,
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it's bad for all those other
countries that we work with
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and that we help provide information
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that helps them secure themselves
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and their people,
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it's bad to expose operations and capabilities
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in a way that allows the people
that we're all working against,
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the generally recognized bad guys,
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to counter those.
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CA: But isn't it also bad to deal
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a kind of body blow to the American companies
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that have essentially given the world
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most of the Internet services that matter?
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RL: It is. It's really the companies are
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in a tough position, as are we,
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because the companies,
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we compel them to provide information,
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just like every other nation in the world does.
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Every industrialized nation in the world
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has a lawful intercept program
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where they are requiring companies
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to provide them with information
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that they need for their security,
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and the companies that are involved
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have complied with those programs
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in the same way that they have to do
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13:03
when they're operating in Russia or the U.K.
285
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3450
13:06
or China or India or France,
286
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4286
13:10
any country that you choose to name.
287
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2018
13:12
And so the fact that these revelations
288
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4909
13:17
have been broadly characterized as
289
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2294
13:20
"you can't trust company A because
290
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1890
13:21
your privacy is suspect with them"
291
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3515
13:25
is actually only accurate in the sense that
292
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4041
13:29
it's accurate with every other company in the world
293
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13:32
that deals with any of those countries in the world.
294
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2159
13:34
And so it's being picked up by people
295
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2128
13:36
as a marketing advantage,
296
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1594
13:38
and it's being marketed that
way by several countries,
297
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1773
13:39
including some of our allied countries,
298
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1511
13:41
where they are saying,
299
809448
1502
13:42
"Hey, you can't trust the U.S.,
300
810950
1529
13:44
but you can trust our telecom company,
301
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2586
13:47
because we're safe."
302
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1354
13:48
And they're actually using that to counter
303
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1659
13:50
the very large technological edge
304
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2318
13:52
that U.S. companies have
305
820396
1809
13:54
in areas like the cloud and
Internet-based technologies.
306
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3906
13:58
CA: You're sitting there with the American flag,
307
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3007
14:01
and the American Constitution guarantees
308
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3570
14:04
freedom from unreasonable search and seizure.
309
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2847
14:07
How do you characterize
310
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1961
14:09
the American citizen's right to privacy?
311
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4480
14:13
Is there such a right?
312
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2281
14:16
RL: Yeah, of course there is.
313
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2736
14:18
And we devote an inordinate
amount of time and pressure,
314
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3043
14:22
inordinate and appropriate, actually I should say,
315
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2284
14:24
amount of time and effort in order to ensure
316
852320
2208
14:26
that we protect that privacy.
317
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2332
14:28
and beyond that, the privacy of citizens
318
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3057
14:31
around the world, it's not just Americans.
319
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3649
14:35
Several things come into play here.
320
863566
1900
14:37
First, we're all in the same network.
321
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1748
14:39
My communications,
322
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1574
14:40
I'm a user of a particular Internet email service
323
868788
4147
14:44
that is the number one email service of choice
324
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3971
14:48
by terrorists around the world, number one.
325
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1593
14:50
So I'm there right beside them in email space
326
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2725
14:53
in the Internet.
327
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1889
14:55
And so we need to be able to pick that apart
328
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3592
14:58
and find the information that's relevant.
329
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3855
15:05
In doing so, we're going to necessarily encounter
330
893131
3362
15:08
Americans and innocent foreign citizens
331
896493
2068
15:10
who are just going about their business,
332
898561
1546
15:12
and so we have procedures in
place that shreds that out,
333
900107
2698
15:14
that says, when you find that,
334
902805
2215
15:17
not if you find it, when you find it,
because you're certain to find it,
335
905020
2267
15:19
here's how you protect that.
336
907287
1783
15:21
These are called minimization procedures.
337
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2105
15:23
They're approved by the attorney general
338
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2028
15:25
and constitutionally based.
339
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1600
15:26
And so we protect those.
340
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2480
15:29
And then, for people, citizens of the world
341
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4471
15:33
who are going about their lawful business
342
921754
1879
15:35
on a day-to-day basis,
343
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1707
15:37
the president on his January 17 speech,
344
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2296
15:39
laid out some additional protections
345
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1493
15:41
that we are providing to them.
346
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2059
15:43
So I think absolutely,
347
931188
1872
15:45
folks do have a right to privacy,
348
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1535
15:46
and that we work very hard to make sure
349
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2619
15:49
that that right to privacy is protected.
350
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2806
15:52
CA: What about foreigners using
351
940020
1736
15:53
American companies' Internet services?
352
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2150
15:55
Do they have any privacy rights?
353
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3845
15:59
RL: They do. They do, in the sense of,
354
947751
2673
16:02
the only way that we are able to compel
355
950424
5740
16:08
one of those companies to provide us information
356
956164
2326
16:10
is when it falls into one of three categories:
357
958490
3462
16:13
We can identify that this particular person,
358
961952
3552
16:17
identified by a selector of some kind,
359
965504
2390
16:19
is associated with counterterrorist
360
967894
3356
16:23
or proliferation or other foreign intelligence target.
361
971250
5249
16:28
CA: Much has been made of the fact that
362
976499
1782
16:30
a lot of the information that you've obtained
363
978281
2466
16:32
through these programs is essentially metadata.
364
980747
2276
16:35
It's not necessarily the actual words
365
983023
2295
16:37
that someone has written in an email
366
985318
1653
16:38
or given on a phone call.
367
986971
1349
16:40
It's who they wrote to and when, and so forth.
368
988320
4049
16:44
But it's been argued,
369
992369
1536
16:45
and someone here in the audience has talked
370
993905
2111
16:48
to a former NSA analyst who said
371
996016
2467
16:50
metadata is actually much more invasive
372
998483
2387
16:52
than the core data,
373
1000870
1403
16:54
because in the core data
374
1002273
1133
16:55
you present yourself as you want to be presented.
375
1003406
3227
16:58
With metadata, who knows what the conclusions are
376
1006633
2706
17:01
that are drawn?
377
1009339
1416
17:02
Is there anything to that?
378
1010755
2006
17:04
RL: I don't really understand that argument.
379
1012761
1789
17:06
I think that metadata's important
for a couple of reasons.
380
1014550
2900
17:09
Metadata is the information that lets you
381
1017450
4478
17:13
find connections that people are trying to hide.
382
1021928
3391
17:17
So when a terrorist is corresponding
383
1025319
2011
17:19
with somebody else who's not known to us
384
1027330
1845
17:21
but is engaged in doing or
supporting terrorist activity,
385
1029175
2608
17:23
or someone who's violating international sanctions
386
1031783
2426
17:26
by providing nuclear weapons-related material
387
1034209
3077
17:29
to a country like Iran or North Korea,
388
1037286
2326
17:31
is trying to hide that activity
because it's illicit activity.
389
1039612
3577
17:35
What metadata lets you do is connect that.
390
1043189
2810
17:37
The alternative to that
391
1045999
1532
17:39
is one that's much less efficient
392
1047531
1619
17:41
and much more invasive of privacy,
393
1049150
1381
17:42
which is gigantic amounts of content collection.
394
1050531
3836
17:46
So metadata, in that sense,
395
1054367
1393
17:47
actually is privacy-enhancing.
396
1055760
2396
17:50
And we don't, contrary to some of the stuff
397
1058156
2105
17:52
that's been printed,
398
1060261
1715
17:53
we don't sit there and grind out
399
1061976
2769
17:56
metadata profiles of average people.
400
1064745
2837
17:59
If you're not connected
401
1067582
1956
18:01
to one of those valid intelligence targets,
402
1069538
3052
18:04
you are not of interest to us.
403
1072590
3413
18:08
CA: So in terms of the threats
404
1076003
3172
18:11
that face America overall,
405
1079175
2312
18:13
where would you place terrorism?
406
1081487
3212
18:16
RL: I think terrorism is still number one.
407
1084699
3098
18:19
I think that we have never been in a time
408
1087797
3904
18:23
where there are more places
409
1091701
1991
18:25
where things are going badly
410
1093692
2853
18:28
and forming the petri dish in which terrorists
411
1096545
3901
18:32
take advantage of the lack of governance.
412
1100446
5310
18:37
An old boss of mine, Tom Fargo, Admiral Fargo,
413
1105756
3637
18:41
used to describe it as arcs of instability.
414
1109393
2213
18:43
And so you have a lot of those arcs of instability
415
1111606
2368
18:45
in the world right now,
416
1113974
1693
18:47
in places like Syria, where there's a civil war
417
1115667
1837
18:49
going on and you have massive numbers,
418
1117504
2710
18:52
thousands and thousands of foreign fighters
419
1120214
1735
18:53
who are coming into Syria
420
1121949
1733
18:55
to learn how to be terrorists
421
1123682
1503
18:57
and practice that activity,
422
1125185
2101
18:59
and lots of those people are Westerners
423
1127286
2699
19:01
who hold passports to European countries
424
1129985
3729
19:05
or in some cases the United States,
425
1133714
1752
19:07
and so they are basically learning how
426
1135466
2401
19:09
to do jihad and have expressed intent
427
1137867
3480
19:13
to go out and do that later on
428
1141347
2413
19:15
in their home countries.
429
1143760
1667
19:17
You've got places like Iraq,
430
1145427
1321
19:18
which is suffering from a high
level of sectarian violence,
431
1146748
2782
19:21
again a breeding ground for terrorism.
432
1149530
2651
19:24
And you have the activity in the Horn of Africa
433
1152181
2506
19:26
and the Sahel area of Africa.
434
1154687
3047
19:29
Again, lots of weak governance
435
1157734
2528
19:32
which forms a breeding ground for terrorist activity.
436
1160262
3891
19:36
So I think it's very serious. I think it's number one.
437
1164153
1994
19:38
I think number two is cyber threat.
438
1166147
2254
19:40
I think cyber is a threat in three ways:
439
1168401
5764
19:46
One way, and probably the most common way
440
1174165
3754
19:49
that people have heard about it,
441
1177919
2192
19:52
is due to the theft of intellectual property,
442
1180111
2000
19:54
so basically, foreign countries going in,
443
1182111
4304
19:58
stealing companies' secrets,
444
1186415
1877
20:00
and then providing that information
445
1188292
1998
20:02
to state-owned enterprises
446
1190290
1737
20:04
or companies connected to the government
447
1192027
2949
20:06
to help them leapfrog technology
448
1194976
2503
20:09
or to gain business intelligence
449
1197479
2075
20:11
that's then used to win contracts overseas.
450
1199554
2668
20:14
That is a hugely costly set of
activities that's going on right now.
451
1202222
3739
20:17
Several nation-states are doing it.
452
1205961
1467
20:19
Second is the denial-of-service attacks.
453
1207428
3225
20:22
You're probably aware that there have been
454
1210653
1379
20:24
a spate of those directed against
455
1212032
1971
20:26
the U.S. financial sector since 2012.
456
1214003
3588
20:29
Again, that's a nation-state who
is executing those attacks,
457
1217591
2617
20:32
and they're doing that
458
1220208
1073
20:33
as a semi-anonymous way of reprisal.
459
1221281
4753
20:38
And the last one is destructive attacks,
460
1226034
1390
20:39
and those are the ones that concern me the most.
461
1227424
1526
20:40
Those are on the rise.
462
1228950
1400
20:42
You have the attack against Saudi Aramco in 2012,
463
1230350
3630
20:45
August of 2012.
464
1233980
1690
20:47
It took down about 35,000 of their computers
465
1235670
2285
20:49
with a Wiper-style virus.
466
1237955
1792
20:51
You had a follow-on a week later
467
1239747
1913
20:53
to a Qatari company.
468
1241660
1534
20:55
You had March of 2013,
469
1243194
2141
20:57
you had a South Korean attack
470
1245335
2671
21:00
that was attributed in the press to North Korea
471
1248006
2433
21:02
that took out thousands of computers.
472
1250439
2055
21:04
Those are on the rise,
473
1252494
1445
21:05
and we see people expressing interest
474
1253939
2734
21:08
in those capabilities
475
1256673
1176
21:09
and a desire to employ them.
476
1257849
2017
21:11
CA: Okay, so a couple of things here,
477
1259866
1566
21:13
because this is really the core of this, almost.
478
1261432
1942
21:15
I mean, first of all,
479
1263374
1264
21:16
a lot of people who look at risk
480
1264638
1558
21:18
and look at the numbers
481
1266196
1217
21:19
don't understand this belief that terrorism
482
1267413
2260
21:21
is still the number one threat.
483
1269673
1884
21:23
Apart from September 11,
484
1271557
1628
21:25
I think the numbers are that
in the last 30 or 40 years
485
1273185
2355
21:27
about 500 Americans have died from terrorism,
486
1275540
3101
21:30
mostly from homegrown terrorists.
487
1278641
3983
21:34
The chance in the last few years
488
1282624
1587
21:36
of being killed by terrorism
489
1284211
1723
21:37
is far less than the chance
of being killed by lightning.
490
1285934
3984
21:41
I guess you would say that a single nuclear incident
491
1289918
3406
21:45
or bioterrorism act or something like that
492
1293324
3326
21:48
would change those numbers.
493
1296650
1901
21:50
Would that be the point of view?
494
1298551
2162
21:52
RL: Well, I'd say two things.
495
1300713
1176
21:53
One is, the reason that there hasn't been
496
1301889
1926
21:55
a major attack in the United States since 9/11,
497
1303815
1810
21:57
that is not an accident.
498
1305625
1556
21:59
That's a lot of hard work that we have done,
499
1307181
2186
22:01
that other folks
500
1309367
1381
22:02
in the intelligence community have done,
501
1310748
1383
22:04
that the military has done,
502
1312131
1181
22:05
and that our allies around the globe have done.
503
1313312
2048
22:07
You've heard the numbers about
504
1315360
2451
22:09
the tip of the iceberg in terms
505
1317811
2532
22:12
of numbers of terrorist attacks that NSA programs
506
1320343
2570
22:14
contributed to stopping was 54,
507
1322913
2759
22:17
25 of those in Europe,
508
1325672
1822
22:19
and of those 25,
509
1327494
2130
22:21
18 of them occurred in three countries,
510
1329624
2605
22:24
some of which are our allies,
511
1332229
1863
22:26
and some of which are beating the heck out of us
512
1334092
2199
22:28
over the NSA programs, by the way.
513
1336291
4477
22:32
So that's not an accident that those things happen.
514
1340768
2692
22:35
That's hard work. That's us finding intelligence
515
1343460
2325
22:37
on terrorist activities
516
1345785
1830
22:39
and interdicting them through one way or another,
517
1347615
1574
22:41
through law enforcement,
518
1349189
1331
22:42
through cooperative activities with other countries
519
1350520
2830
22:45
and sometimes through military action.
520
1353350
3116
22:48
The other thing I would say is that
521
1356466
2893
22:51
your idea of nuclear or chem-bio-threat
522
1359359
5266
22:56
is not at all far-fetched
523
1364625
1516
22:58
and in fact there are a number of groups
524
1366141
1738
22:59
who have for several years expressed interest
525
1367879
1887
23:01
and desire in obtaining those capabilities
526
1369766
2540
23:04
and work towards that.
527
1372306
1760
23:06
CA: It's also been said that,
528
1374066
1576
23:07
of those 54 alleged incidents,
529
1375642
2700
23:10
that as few as zero of them
530
1378342
1848
23:12
were actually anything to do
531
1380190
1062
23:13
with these controversial programs
532
1381252
1847
23:15
that Mr. Snowden revealed,
533
1383099
3732
23:18
that it was basically through
other forms of intelligence,
534
1386831
3917
23:22
that you're looking for a needle in a haystack,
535
1390748
2890
23:25
and the effects of these programs,
536
1393638
1562
23:27
these controversial programs,
537
1395200
1031
23:28
is just to add hay to the stack,
538
1396231
2072
23:30
not to really find the needle.
539
1398303
1580
23:31
The needle was found by other methods.
540
1399883
2082
23:33
Isn't there something to that?
541
1401965
4124
23:38
RL: No, there's actually two programs
542
1406089
2408
23:40
that are typically implicated in that discussion.
543
1408497
2417
23:42
One is the section 215 program,
544
1410914
2478
23:45
the U.S. telephony metadata program,
545
1413392
2978
23:48
and the other one is
546
1416370
2040
23:50
popularly called the PRISM program,
547
1418410
1594
23:52
and it's actually section 702
of the FISA Amendment Act.
548
1420004
3248
23:55
But the 215 program
549
1423252
4190
23:59
is only relevant to threats
550
1427442
1727
24:01
that are directed against the United States,
551
1429169
2259
24:03
and there have been a dozen threats
552
1431428
2900
24:06
where that was implicated.
553
1434328
1315
24:07
Now what you'll see people say publicly
554
1435643
3189
24:10
is there is no "but for" case,
555
1438832
2036
24:12
and so there is no case where, but for that,
556
1440868
3813
24:16
the threat would have happened.
557
1444681
1701
24:18
But that actually indicates a lack of understanding
558
1446382
4207
24:22
of how terrorist investigations actually work.
559
1450589
5117
24:27
You think about on television,
560
1455706
1478
24:29
you watch a murder mystery.
561
1457184
1332
24:30
What do you start with? You start with a body,
562
1458516
1530
24:32
and then they work their way
from there to solve the crime.
563
1460046
2236
24:34
We're actually starting well before that,
564
1462282
1531
24:35
hopefully before there are any bodies,
565
1463813
1501
24:37
and we're trying to build the case for
566
1465314
2433
24:39
who the people are, what they're trying to do,
567
1467747
2430
24:42
and that involves massive amounts of information.
568
1470177
2850
24:45
Think of it is as mosaic,
569
1473027
1481
24:46
and it's hard to say that any one piece of a mosaic
570
1474508
2162
24:48
was necessary to building the mosaic,
571
1476670
2632
24:51
but to build the complete picture,
572
1479302
1729
24:53
you need to have all the pieces of information.
573
1481031
1965
24:54
On the other, the non-U.S.-related
threats out of those 54,
574
1482996
3105
24:58
the other 42 of them,
575
1486101
3189
25:01
the PRISM program was hugely relevant to that,
576
1489290
4630
25:05
and in fact was material in contributing
577
1493920
2986
25:08
to stopping those attacks.
578
1496906
1882
25:10
CA: Snowden said two days ago
579
1498788
1337
25:12
that terrorism has always been
580
1500125
3370
25:15
what is called in the intelligence world
581
1503495
2128
25:17
"a cover for action,"
582
1505623
1546
25:19
that it's something that,
583
1507169
1937
25:21
because it invokes such a powerful
584
1509106
1716
25:22
emotional response in people,
585
1510822
1839
25:24
it allows the initiation of these programs
586
1512661
2634
25:27
to achieve powers that an organization like yours
587
1515295
3561
25:30
couldn't otherwise have.
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Is there any internal debate about that?
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25:35
RL: Yeah.
590
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1412
25:37
I mean, we debate these things all the time,
591
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2000
25:39
and there is discussion that goes on
592
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2759
25:42
in the executive branch
593
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1921
25:43
and within NSA itself
594
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2063
25:46
and the intelligence community about
595
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1655
25:47
what's right, what's proportionate,
596
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1360
25:49
what's the correct thing to do.
597
1537045
1261
25:50
And it's important to note that the programs
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25:51
that we're talking about
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1347
25:53
were all authorized by two different presidents,
600
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3402
25:56
two different political parties,
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1544633
1745
25:58
by Congress twice,
602
1546378
2135
26:00
and by federal judges 16 different times,
603
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3836
26:04
and so this is not NSA running off
604
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4712
26:09
and doing its own thing.
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1463
26:10
This is a legitimate activity
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2448
26:12
of the United States foreign government
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2518
26:15
that was agreed to by all the branches
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2175
26:17
of the United States government,
609
1565665
1984
26:19
and President Madison would have been proud.
610
1567649
3049
26:22
CA: And yet, when congressmen discovered
611
1570698
4089
26:26
what was actually being done
with that authorization,
612
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2230
26:29
many of them were completely shocked.
613
1577017
2869
26:31
Or do you think that is not a legitimate reaction,
614
1579886
3346
26:35
that it's only because it's now come out publicly,
615
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2105
26:37
that they really knew exactly what you were doing
616
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3102
26:40
with the powers they had granted you?
617
1588439
2336
26:42
RL: Congress is a big body.
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1590775
1674
26:44
There's 535 of them,
619
1592449
1977
26:46
and they change out frequently,
620
1594426
2141
26:48
in the case of the House, every two years,
621
1596567
1858
26:50
and I think that the NSA provided
622
1598425
3776
26:54
all the relevant information
to our oversight committees,
623
1602201
3137
26:57
and then the dissemination of that information
624
1605338
2278
26:59
by the oversight committees throughout Congress
625
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1899
27:01
is something that they manage.
626
1609515
2634
27:04
I think I would say that Congress members
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4856
27:09
had the opportunity to make themselves aware,
628
1617005
3831
27:12
and in fact a significant number of them,
629
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1869
27:14
the ones who are assigned oversight responsibility,
630
1622705
3458
27:18
did have the ability to do that.
631
1626163
1174
27:19
And you've actually had the chairs of
those committees say that in public.
632
1627337
3938
27:23
CA: Now, you mentioned the
threat of cyberattacks,
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1557
27:24
and I don't think anyone in this room would disagree
634
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2167
27:26
that that is a huge concern,
635
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1890
27:28
but do you accept that there's a tradeoff
636
1636889
1834
27:30
between offensive and defensive strategies,
637
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2411
27:33
and that it's possible that the very measures taken
638
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2825
27:35
to, "weaken encryption,"
639
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2669
27:38
and allow yourself to find the bad guys,
640
1646628
2153
27:40
might also open the door to forms of cyberattack?
641
1648781
4273
27:45
RL: So I think two things.
642
1653054
2843
27:47
One is, you said weaken encryption. I didn't.
643
1655897
3847
27:51
And the other one is that
644
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5126
27:56
the NSA has both of those missions,
645
1664870
2776
27:59
and we are heavily biased towards defense,
646
1667646
2281
28:01
and, actually, the vulnerabilities that we find
647
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3517
28:05
in the overwhelming majority of cases,
648
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2101
28:07
we disclose to the people who are responsible
649
1675545
2773
28:10
for manufacturing or developing those products.
650
1678318
3363
28:13
We have a great track record of that,
651
1681681
1383
28:15
and we're actually working on a proposal right now
652
1683064
1986
28:17
to be transparent and to
publish transparency reports
653
1685050
3170
28:20
in the same way that the Internet companies
654
1688220
2886
28:23
are being allowed to publish
transparency reports for them.
655
1691106
3867
28:26
We want to be more transparent about that.
656
1694973
1998
28:28
So again, we eat our own dog food.
657
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3129
28:32
We use the standards, we use the products
658
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2253
28:34
that we recommend,
659
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2655
28:37
and so it's in our interest
660
1705008
2295
28:39
to keep our communications protected
661
1707303
2638
28:41
in the same way that other people's need to be.
662
1709941
3804
28:45
CA: Edward Snowden,
663
1713745
3190
28:48
when, after his talk, was wandering the halls here
664
1716935
4428
28:53
in the bot,
665
1721363
1245
28:54
and I heard him say to a couple of people,
666
1722608
2188
28:56
they asked him about what he thought
667
1724796
1617
28:58
of the NSA overall,
668
1726413
1593
29:00
and he was very complimentary about the people
669
1728006
2773
29:02
who work with you,
670
1730779
2021
29:04
said that it's a really
671
1732800
3923
29:08
impassioned group of employees
672
1736723
1960
29:10
who are seeking to do the right thing,
673
1738683
2449
29:13
and that the problems have come from
674
1741132
2954
29:16
just some badly conceived policies.
675
1744086
3119
29:19
He came over certainly very reasonably and calmly.
676
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4445
29:23
He didn't come over like a crazy man.
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2175
29:25
Would you accept that at least,
678
1753825
1970
29:27
even if you disagree with how he did it,
679
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3016
29:30
that he has opened a debate that matters?
680
1758811
4024
29:34
RL: So I think that the discussion
681
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2398
29:37
is an important one to have.
682
1765233
1864
29:39
I do not like the way that he did it.
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3376
29:42
I think there were a number of other ways
684
1770473
2005
29:44
that he could have done that
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1462
29:45
that would have not endangered our people
686
1773940
3296
29:49
and the people of other nations
687
1777236
2648
29:51
through losing visibility
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1779884
2111
29:53
into what our adversaries are doing.
689
1781995
2731
29:56
But I do think it's an important conversation.
690
1784726
2686
29:59
CA: It's been reported that there's
691
1787412
1539
30:00
almost a difference of opinion
692
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2109
30:03
with you and your colleagues
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1471
30:04
over any scenario in which
694
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2053
30:06
he might be offered an amnesty deal.
695
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2603
30:09
I think your boss, General Keith Alexander,
696
1797187
2711
30:11
has said that that would be a terrible example
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1799898
1986
30:13
for others;
698
1801884
1465
30:15
you can't negotiate with someone
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1803349
1657
30:17
who's broken the law in that way.
700
1805006
2008
30:19
But you've been quoted as saying that,
701
1807014
2009
30:21
if Snowden could prove that he was surrendering
702
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3208
30:24
all undisclosed documents,
703
1812231
1796
30:26
that a deal maybe should be considered.
704
1814027
2239
30:28
Do you still think that?
705
1816266
2970
30:31
RL: Yeah, so actually,
706
1819236
1518
30:32
this is my favorite thing about
that "60 Minutes" interview
707
1820754
2583
30:35
was all the misquotes that came from that.
708
1823337
1712
30:37
What I actually said, in
response to a question about,
709
1825049
2915
30:39
would you entertain any discussions
710
1827964
1812
30:41
of mitigating action against Snowden,
711
1829776
6385
30:48
I said, yeah, it's worth a conversation.
712
1836161
1832
30:49
This is something that the attorney general
713
1837993
1635
30:51
of the United States and the president also
714
1839628
1930
30:53
actually have both talked about this,
715
1841558
1538
30:55
and I defer to the attorney general,
716
1843096
1369
30:56
because this is his lane.
717
1844465
1547
30:58
But there is a strong tradition
718
1846012
2509
31:00
in American jurisprudence
719
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3192
31:03
of having discussions with people
720
1851713
4575
31:08
who have been charged with crimes in order to,
721
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1844
31:10
if it benefits the government,
722
1858132
1516
31:11
to get something out of that,
723
1859648
2378
31:14
that there's always room for that kind of discussion.
724
1862026
2634
31:16
So I'm not presupposing any outcome,
725
1864660
1689
31:18
but there is always room for discussion.
726
1866349
3736
31:22
CA: To a lay person it seems like
727
1870085
1600
31:23
he has certain things to offer the U.S.,
728
1871685
3368
31:27
the government, you, others,
729
1875053
1739
31:28
in terms of putting things right
730
1876792
1681
31:30
and helping figure out a smarter policy,
731
1878473
2058
31:32
a smarter way forward for the future.
732
1880531
5206
31:38
Do you see, has that kind of possibility
733
1886988
2073
31:41
been entertained at all?
734
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2398
31:43
RL: So that's out of my lane.
735
1891459
1638
31:45
That's not an NSA thing.
736
1893097
1529
31:46
That would be a Department of Justice
737
1894626
2207
31:48
sort of discussion.
738
1896833
2497
31:51
I'll defer to them.
739
1899330
3296
31:54
CA: Rick, when Ed Snowden ended his talk,
740
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2965
31:57
I offered him the chance to
share an idea worth spreading.
741
1905591
3745
32:01
What would be your idea worth spreading
742
1909336
1653
32:02
for this group?
743
1910989
2282
32:05
RL: So I think, learn the facts.
744
1913271
1992
32:07
This is a really important conversation,
745
1915263
2616
32:09
and it impacts, it's not just NSA,
746
1917879
2076
32:11
it's not just the government,
747
1919955
1198
32:13
it's you, it's the Internet companies.
748
1921153
2908
32:16
The issue of privacy and personal data
749
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3118
32:19
is much bigger than just the government,
750
1927179
1577
32:20
and so learn the facts.
751
1928756
1911
32:22
Don't rely on headlines,
752
1930667
1596
32:24
don't rely on sound bites,
753
1932263
1676
32:25
don't rely on one-sided conversations.
754
1933939
2480
32:28
So that's the idea, I think, worth spreading.
755
1936419
3149
32:31
We have a sign, a badge tab,
756
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3393
32:34
we wear badges at work with lanyards,
757
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1889
32:36
and if I could make a plug,
758
1944850
1413
32:38
my badge lanyard at work says, "Dallas Cowboys."
759
1946263
2747
32:41
Go Dallas.
760
1949010
3497
32:44
I've just alienated half the audience, I know.
761
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2666
32:47
So the lanyard that our people
762
1955173
3896
32:51
who work in the organization
763
1959069
1785
32:52
that does our crypto-analytic work
764
1960854
2420
32:55
have a tab that says, "Look at the data."
765
1963274
1941
32:57
So that's the idea worth spreading.
766
1965215
1536
32:58
Look at the data.
767
1966751
2249
33:01
CA: Rick, it took a certain amount of courage,
768
1969000
2992
33:03
I think, actually, to come and speak openly
769
1971992
2615
33:06
to this group.
770
1974607
1254
33:07
It's not something the NSA
has done a lot of in the past,
771
1975861
2667
33:10
and plus the technology has been challenging.
772
1978528
3095
33:13
We truly appreciate you doing that
773
1981623
1781
33:15
and sharing in this very important conversation.
774
1983404
2413
33:17
Thank you so much.
775
1985817
2141
33:19
RL: Thanks, Chris.
776
1987958
1939
33:21
(Applause)
777
1989897
7071

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ABOUT THE SPEAKER
Richard Ledgett - Deputy director, NSA
Richard Ledgett is deputy director and senior civilian leader of the National Security Agency. He acts as the agency’s chief operating officer, responsible for guiding and directing studies, operations and policy.

Why you should listen

Richard Ledgett began his NSA career in 1988 and has served in operational, management, and technical leadership positions at the branch, division, office, and group levels. Now, think of him as the COO of the NSA, guiding and directing studies, operations and policy. From 2012 to 2013 he was the Director of the NSA/CSS Threat Operations Center, responsible for round-the-clock cryptologic activities to discover and counter adversary cyber efforts. Prior to NTOC he served in several positions from 2010 to 2012 in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in both the collection and cyber mission areas. He was the first National Intelligence Manager for Cyber, serving as principal advisor to the Director of National Intelligence on all cyber matters, leading development of the Unified Intelligence Strategy for Cyber, and coordinating cyber activities across the Intelligence Community (IC). Previous positions at NSA include Deputy Director for Analysis and Production (2009-2010), Deputy Director for Data Acquisition (2006-2009), Assistant Deputy Director for Data Acquisition (2005-2006), and Chief, NSA/CSS Pacific (2002-2005). He also served in a joint IC operational activity, and as an instructor and course developer at the National Cryptologic School.

He led the NSA Media Leaks Task Force from June 2013 to January 2014, and was responsible for integrating and overseeing the totality of NSA’s efforts surrounding the unauthorized disclosures of classified information by a former NSA affiliate.

More profile about the speaker
Richard Ledgett | Speaker | TED.com